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COMMENT

Between a Rock and a Hard Place in

Illinois: Constitutional Responses to
Adverse Waste Facility Siting Decisions
INTRODUCTION

The problem of where to dispose of solid waste promises to
be one of the most complex, expensive and emotional issues
to confront this Nation as it prepares to enter the twenty-first
century. With recycling technology lagging far behind this
country's ability to produce trash, we must continually search
for new places to put all the things that we have discarded....
Everyone would agree that trash must be disposed of, but very
few would volunteer to have it dumped in the environment
near their homes. The simple truth is that no one wants to
live near a landfill .... However, the "not in my backyard"
(or "NIMBY") attitude . . . while understandable, is not
conducive to finding legal and efficient solutions to this dilemma.'
This familiar recognition of the tension between public opposition
to neighboring waste 2 facilities and shrinking disposal capacity' suggests
1. Government Suppliers Consol. Servs., Inc. v. Bayh, 734 F. Supp. 853, 855
(S.D. Ind. 1990) (reviewing waste haulers' motion for a preliminary injunction to
prevent enforcement of Indiana laws which burdened out-of-state haulers).
2. "Waste" refers to both solid and hazardous waste throughout the comment
unless specifically limited. "'[W]aste' means any garbage, sludge from a waste
treatment plant, water supply treatment plant, or air pollution control facility or other
discarded material, including solid, liquid, semi-solid, or contained gaseous material
resulting from industrial, commercial, mining and agricultural operations, and from
community activities ..... " ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111 1/2, para. 1003.53 (1991).
"Hazardous waste" means a waste, or combination of wastes, which because
of its quantity, concentration, or physical, chemical, or infectious characteristics may cause or significantly contribute to an increase in mortality or an
increase in serious, irreversible, or incapacitating reversible, illness; or pose
a substantial present or potential hazard to human health or the environment
when improperly treated, stored, transported, or disposed of, or otherwise
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that technical, political, planning and legal entities should act collectively to solve the nation's waste problems. Although not every region
of the nation is troubled by vanishing disposal capacity, 4the problem
is critical in some regions and becoming critical in others.
Illinois is no stranger to the waste dilemma. It is a leader among
states in waste generation.' Moreover,. the large volume of waste generated
in Illinois may soon surpass the state's ability to assure adequate disposal6
managed, and which has been identified, by characteristics or listing, as
hazardous pursuant to Section 3001 of the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act of 1976, P.L. 94-580, or pursuant to Board regulations.
Id. para. 1003.15.
3. The number of landfills in the United States in 1986 was one-half 1976
levels. This drastic reduction has been attributed to comprehensive regulation of waste
facilities and difficulties encountered in siting new facilities. Resource Conservation &
Recovery Act Oversight: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Hazardous Wastes and
Toxic Substances of the Comm. on the Environment and Public Works, 100th Cong.,
1st Sess. 111 (1987) [hereinafter Senate Hearings 1] (statement of Sheila M. Prindiville,
Dir. of Solid Wastes Programs, National Solid Waste Management Association
(NSWMA)). The Environmental Protection Agency [hereinafter EPA] has estimated
that in fifteen (15) years, seventy-five percent (750o) of today's landfills will close.
Interstate Transport and Disposal of Solid Waste: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Environmental Protection of the Comm. on the Environment and Public Works, 101st
Cong., 2d Sess. 58 (1990) [hereinafter Senate Hearings Ill (statement of Senator Dan
Coats (Ind.)).

4. Senate Hearings 1, supra note 3, at 106; cf., Senate Hearings II, supra note
3, at 115. (NSWMA summary of data on interstate movement of waste indicates that
eight (8) states export all their waste. These states include New York and New Jersey
which contribute fifty-three percent (53%) of all waste in interstate commerce.). The
increase in the interstate movement of waste has prompted some states such as New
Mexico, Mississippi, and Maine to impose moratoriums on new facilities and to ban
for-profit operation of waste facilities. These states took drastic measures in response
to a perception that they were becoming dumping grounds for other states. Id. at 5859 (statement of Senator Coats).
5. Illinois ranks second among the states in waste generation and has been
slow to clear its reputation for failing to protect its citizens from hazards associated
with the generation of large quantities of waste. J. Maichle Bacon, Local Government
Approaches to Siting: The Problems and Their Resolution, in TBE SrrINo PUZZLE:
PmcnN TOGETHER ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY 1985, at
13 (Proceedings of 13th Annual Illinois Dep't of Energy and Natural Resources
Conference, Chicago, Sept. 13th and 14th, 1984); see also DIVIsION OF LAND POLLUTION
CONTROL, ILLINOIs ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY (IEPA), COMPANIES THAT GENERATE
HAZARDOUS WASTE & SHn IT OFF SIE: 1988 ANNUAL REPORT 307 (1990) (compiling
data on 2,440 RCRA generators which produce 85,741,591 gallons and 402,535 tons
of RCRA wastes).
6. "Disposal" means the discharge, deposit, injection, dumping, spilling,
leaking or placing of any waste or hazardous waste into or on any land or
water or into any well so that such waste or hazardous waste or any
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capacity. 7 Although Illinois has embraced waste reduction and recovery

as preferred alternatives to disposal, it recognizes that it must continue

to site sanitary landfills8 and hazardous waste disposal facilities as a
matter of public policy.9 Many authors agree that assurance of adequate disposal capacity represents sound public policy because promotion of technically correct siting reduces the possibility of illegal
dumping.

0

The need for such assurance of adequate disposal capacity is

coterminous with the overwhelming public opposition to additional

waste sites. Moved by fear and armed with votes, citizens are formidable opponents for locally undesirable land uses (LULUs) such as
waste facilities."
constituent thereof may enter the environment or be emitted into the air or
discharged into any waters, including ground waters.

ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111 1/2, para. 1003.08 (1991).

7. The Illinois General Assembly recently found that current waste management
practices do not correct the imbalance between increasing demand and decreasing
capacity. Illinois Solid Waste Management Act [hereinafter ISWMA], ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 111 1/2, paras. 7052(a)(l)-(3) (1991). See also infra notes 29-40 and accompanying
text for an empirical analysis of current disposal capacity.
8. "Sanitary landfill" means a facility permitted by the Agency for the
disposal of waste on land meeting the requirements of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, P.L. 94-580, and regulations thereunder, and
without creating nuisances or hazards to public health or safety, by confining
the refuse to the smallest practical volume and covering it with a layer of
earth at the conclusion of each day's operation, or by such other methods
and intervals as the Board may provide by regulation.
ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 111 1/2, para. 1003.41 (1991).
9. Solid Waste Planning and Recycling Act (SWPRA), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 85,
para. 5952 (1991); see also ISWMA, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111 1/2, para. 7052(b) (1991).
10. See Isabelle R. Davidson, An Analysis of Existing Requirements for Siting
and Permitting Hazardous Waste Disposal Facilities and a Proposal for a More
Workable System, 34 ADMIN. L* REV. 533, 551 (1982); Michael F. Reilly, Transformation At Work: The Effect of Environmental Law on Land Use Control, 24 REAL
PROP. PROB. TR. J. 33, 69 (1989); Stephen Sussna, Remedying Hazardous Waste
Facility Siting Maladies by Considering Zoning and Other Devices, 16 Urn. LAW. 29,
35, 47-8 (1984); R. George Wright, Hazardous Waste Disposal and the Problems of
Stigmatic and Racial Injury, 23 ARiz. ST. L.J. 777, 777-78 (1991); Joseph C. Gergits,

Comment, Enhancing the Community's Role in Landfill Siting in Illinois, 1987 U.
ILL. L. REv. 97, 98; cf. William L. Andreen, Defusing the "Not in My Back Yard"

Syndrome: An Approach to Federal Preemption of State and Local Impediments to
the Siting of PCB DisposalFacilities, 63 N.C. L. REv. 811 (1985); Douglas J. Snyder,
Comment, The EPA-North Carolina Dispute: The Right of States to Pass Stricter
Laws Under the Resource Conservationand Recovery Act, 8 VA. J.
L. 171, 172 (1988).
11. See Reilly, supra note 10, at 68.

NAT.

REsouRcEs
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The nature of the opposition should not be underestimated,
nor should its resources. This is an issue that has triggered the
emotions of rich and poor, powerful and weak, and educated
and illiterate. The public opposition directed at American
involvement in Viet Nam and the anti-nuke protests are likely

to be dwarfed by the organizational and technical expertise of

people fighting against hazardous waste facilities in their com2
munities.
Strident opposition to local siting attempts is not without reason. After
all, waste facilities traditionally' mean increased local costs which are
not offset by local benefits arising from the operation. 3 Nevertheless,
local self-interest must yield to technically sound waste management if
we are to avoid a "tragedy of the commons."' 4
Commercial waste facility developers and companies which treat
waste on-site stand prepared to offer technically sound solutions to
diminishing disposal capacity.' 5 In Illinois, however, attempts to site
modern facilities and to improve existing on-site treatment have been
12. Sussna, supra note 10, at 48.
13. This author recognizes the disadvantages perceived by local residents. The
negative externalities commonly associated with waste facilities include increased risks
to human health, decreased property values, and decline in surrounding environmental
quality. Moreover, citizens understand that the costs are not offset to a large degree
by economic gain to the community because waste facilities are capital rather than
labor intensive. In short, there is more to lose than to gain from a waste facility; see,
Wright, supra note 10, at 779; Lawrence Susskind, The Siting Puzzle: Balancing
Economic and Environmental Gains and Losses, in Piecing Together Economic
Development and Environmental Quality 1985, at 1-2 (Proceedings of the 13th Annual
Illinois Dep't of Energy and Natural Resources Conference, Chicago, Sept. 13th and
14th, 1984). Thus, their decision-making is rational when their view includes only the
local scene. However, beyond the local horizon is the real risk that inadequate waste
handling capacity will lead to greater national risks.
14. "Tragedy of the commons" describes the effect of localized decisionmaking
on environmental issues.
Centralized decisionmaking is more efficient than decentralized decisionmaking whenever conditions are such that rational but independent pursuit by
each decisionmaking unit of its own self-interest leads to results that leave
all units worse off than they would have been had they been constrained to
adopting consensual decisions applicable to all.
J.B. Ruhl, Interstate Pollution Control and Resource Development Planning: Out-'
moded Approaches or Outmoded Politics?, 28 NAT. RESOURCES J.293, 297 (1988).
15. See Sussna, supra note 10, at 35. In Illinois, one hundred and seventy-two
(172) siting proposals for regional pollution control facilities (RPCFs) were submitted
between 1981 and 1990. DIwSION OF LAND POLLUTION CONTROL, ILLINOIS ENMVL.

PROTECTION AGENCY, REGIONAL POLLUTION CONTROL FACILITY SmING IN ILLINOIS, i
(990) [hereinafter IEPA SIrING REPORT].
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frustrated by a statutory scheme which emphasizes local participation

over technical requirements. 1 6 Private waste management entities have

found themselves lodged between a rock and a hard place. They have
invested large sums in attempts to provide necessary disposal capacity

for wastes generated by others 7 but have often been denied an
operating permit due to the near-veto power vested in county boards. 8
This comment is designed to provide environmental and land-use
practitioners with constitutionally-grounded arguments which will help
extricate their waste-management clients from between the rock and
the hard place.' 9

Part I of this comment discusses the waste management dilemma
embodied in the Illinois statutory siting scheme and perpetuated by
Illinois courts. I(A) provides additional empirical support for the

proposition that disposal capacity is and will continue to be a real

issue in Illinois. I(B) outlines the Illinois statutory siting criteria and
explains how the criteria are applied. I(C) examines the role played by
Illinois courts in interpreting the criteria, in dealing with appeals based,
in part, upon staunch public opposition, and in actively promoting the
local government veto over waste disposal facilities.

16. See infra notes 27-40 and accompanying text.
17. For example, in recent years, Laidlaw Waste Systems, Inc. has attempted to
site four facilities. Those applications have resulted in two local denials. Two are
pending. The amount of money invested in the local approval portion of the siting
attempts ranges from two hundred thousand to several million dollars with no
guarantee of any return on investment. A company representative explained that
Illinois has one of the more onerous siting statutes in the country because the process
is very political at the local level. The company believes that the statute provides for
technical criteria which are demonstrable, but the statutory process has frustrated
siting attempts due to almost universal community disapproval of siting any facilities.
The company faces an uphill battle with each siting attempt because it must invest
large sums of money to demonstrate the technical viability of state-of-the-art waste
facilities to county boards with no guarantee that local government will hear the
technical information over vocal public opposition. Telephone Interview with Miles
Stotts, Regional Environmental Manager, Laidlaw Waste Systems, Inc. of Illinois,
Arlington Heights, Illinois (March 30, 1992).
18. See, e.g., Marla Donato, Environment on Edgar's Mind, Garbage a Top
Priority of Governor, State EPA Official Says, Cm. Tm., April 15, 1991, § DuPage
at 2 (reporting that Illinois residents are generating more garbage, depleting capacity,
and failing to approve new disposal outlets). See also infra notes 70-133 and accompanying text for an in-depth discussion of Illinois siting denials which have been
challenged in court.
19. As suggested in the introductory comments, many public policy considerations are incorporated in the debate over how to accomplish waste facility siting.
While the aim of this comment is not to provide the state with solutions to its waste
dilemma, to the extent that the analysis contained herein promotes sound siting,
Illinois may become the beneficiary of future increases in disposal capacity.
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Part II analyzes whether the Supremacy Clause 0 provides the
practitioner with a viable argument that comprehensive federal environmental legislation effectively preempts the Illinois siting statute.
II(A) discusses the historical development of preemption doctrine and
lays the foundation for proper analysis of the role of local participation
in waste siting in light of comprehensive federal regulation. II(B) asks
whether either the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) 21
or the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and
Liability Act (CERCLA)22 explicitly or implicitly preempts Illinois'
siting statute. II(C) argues that a basis for preemption is currently
embodied within the legislative intent of both federal laws and, alternatively, that future legislation, directed at national capacity shortages,
is likely to unambiguously preempt local vetoes of waste sites.
Part III queries whether recent developments in "takings" doctrine, which are arguably more favorable to property owners, 23 provide
the impetus for waste management developers to seek either invalidation of the siting scheme or just compensation pursuant to the mandate
of the Fifth Amendment. 24 III(A) offers an overview of the Supreme
Court's historical treatment of Fifth Amendment claims. III(B) analyzes three recent Supreme Court decisions 25 and their progeny in lower
federal and state courts with a view toward providing the petitioner
with a body of recent case law which may be used to indicate the
illegitimacy of the Illinois siting statute. III(C) concludes that the' time
may be ripe for Illinois waste management entities to assert a Fifth
Amendment claim against the state's siting scheme because it deprives
them of investment-backed expectations and deprives them of economically viable use of their property.
I.

PUBLIC OPPOSITION AS A DOMINANT FACTOR IN WASTE FACILITY
SITING IN ILLINOIS

One author has recently conveyed the frustration caused by Illinois's siting statute which allows public participation as follows:
20. This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be
made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made,
under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the
Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any thing in the
Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.

U.S. CONST. art. VI,

§ 2.

21. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992 (1988).
22. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988).
23. See infra notes 325-27, 337 and accompanying text.
24. U.S. CONST. amend. V ("[N]or be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without
just compensation.")
25. See infra notes 289-91 and accompanying text.
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Given the sense of public concern for the environmental and
health hazards associated with solid waste disposal, particularly
hazardous waste, much of the legislative and regulatory initiatives have attempted to concentrate on developing some means
of institutionalizing a decision-making process for establishing
new disposal sites, which is both workable in terms of providing
sufficient capacity to handle wastes now being generated and
also achieves public confidence. The general method used, and
one which has, in fact, been mandated by Congress, is that
which includes at a minimum, public participation in the
process.
Unfortunately, few decision-making processes are currently achieving anything except to provide an arena for displays of mass discontent on the part of the host community,
and protracted and seemingly endless litigation.2
Part I of this comment addresses the source of waste developers'
frustration with the siting process and is subdivided into three sections.
Empirical support is provided for the propositions that the overall
scheme has created extreme difficulties for commercial waste facilities
and industrial generators and has placed the state in a precarious
position regarding capacity assurances. Next, the statutory criteria is
described in some detail. Finally, the role played by Illinois courts in
perpetuating siting difficulties is analyzed; particular emphasis is focused on the Illinois Supreme Court's decision in Village of Carpentersville v. Pollution Control Board 7 because the case illustrates well
how Illinois courts have perpetuated siting difficulties and left waste
generators, processors, and facility operators between a rock and a
hard place.
A.

THE NEED TO ASSURE ADEQUATE WASTE DISPOSAL CAPACITY

If Illinois had all the capacity necessary to assure that wastes could
be properly disposed of, then the mechanism for approving additional
facilities would be less pivotal to this discussion. However, the state has
admitted that its siting mechanism has not been successful in assuring
capacity for all types of waste in all geographic regions of the state.3
26. William A. Speary, Jr., Solid Waste Issues for the Nineties, 1990

PLAN. ZONING & EMNENT Do

INST. ON

rN 2-1, § 2.04 (citing author's participation in the

longest siting battle in Illinois history).

27. 553 N.E.2d 362 (Ill. 1990).
28. See supra note 9 and accompanying text. (The General Assembly has declared
the need for additional waste sites as a matter of public policy, but has not moved
for change in the siting process.).
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Although Illinois presently hosts numerous disposal sites,2 many are
approaching capacity.3 0
As part of an on-going project, the Illinois EPA assesses the
state's experience with the siting process." Although the IEPA reports
that since 1981 local governments have approved seventy-five percent
(750) of the permit applications submitted,32 the statistic is misleading

as to available capacity for several reasons. It fails to account for low

approval of new facility applications which is only fifty-eight percent

(580%0).

33 It

includes approvals in Cook County which are exempt from

the siting statute.3 4 Forty-four of the approvals were for expansions
and modifications to existing sites." Moreover, many of the approvals
represent applications for transfer stations which do not add capacity
and which are not as threatening to communities.3 6 The recent net
decline in disposal capacity is most telling of the Illinois experience in
siting facilities.37
The prospect for adding capacity for disposal of hazardous waste
is even more dismal. Although Illinois recently certified to the Federal
Environmental Protection Agency, pursuant to the CERCLA man29. MEHNERT, EDWARD, ET AL., ILLINOIS DEP'T. OF ENERGY AND NATURAL

RESOURCES,

STATEWIDE INVENTORY OF LAND-BASED

DISPOSAL SITES FY '88 UPDATE

23-31 (1990) (providing update for computerized tracking of waste facilities sponsored
by the Hazardous Waste Research and Information Center with information gathered
from IEPA and Northeastern Planning Commission) (figs. 2-10 provide scatter maps
indicating waste disposal sites by category).
30. ILLINOIS ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, AVAILABLE DISPOSAL CAPACITY FOR
ILLINOIs-THIRD ANNUAL REPORT 1-62 (1989).

SOLID WASTE IN

31. See IEPA SITNG

REPORT, supra note 15, at i.
32. Id. at 9.
33. Id.(indicating that local governments have a better record of approval for
modifications and expansions of landfills as opposed to new facilities). Since 1981,
only five (5) new landfills have become operational. Id. at 19.
34. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111 1/2, .para. 1039.2(h) (1991). "Nothing in this Section
shall apply to any existing or new regional pollution control facility located within an
unincorporated area of any county having a population over 3,000,000 or within the
corporate limits of cities or municipalities with a population of over 1,000,000." Of
the total local approvals, sixteen were approved by Cook County which does not have
the same notice and public hearing requirements. IEPA SITING REPORT, supra note
15, at 11-12.
35. IEPA SrrING REPORT, supra note 15, at 26, 34.
36. Id. at 41.
37. This author maintains that public opposition to facility siting is gathering
strength and represents a continuing threat to disposal capacity. The IEPA siting
report indicates a net reduction in disposal capacity of fifty-nine (59) million cubic
yards over a two year period from 1988 through 1990. IEPA SrING REPORT, supra
note 15, at i.
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date,38 that it could assure capacity for the next twenty years, the
empirical support for such an assertion is less than convincing.3 9 State
officials themselves doubt the validity of the certification of capacity
assurance for hazardous wastes. The plans have been called a "paper-

work exercise" which are "particularly inaccurate and unreliable for

states that are large importers" and "do not reflect actual hazardous
waste management movement or capacity.' ,4
The evidence is clear that there is a current need for additional
waste sites and that Illinois has not adequately responded to that need.
The state's ability to assure adequate capacity is critical to this author's
preemption argument in part II because capacity assurance is a focal
point of federal environmental legislation. 4' Furthermore, capacity
assurances could become more important in the future if Congress
authorizes the states to restrict imports, requiring Illinois to become
more self-sufficient. 42 Thus, environmental and land-use practitioners
should not overlook the argument that the need for additional disposal
capacity provides the impetus for asserting that the siting scheme is
not conducive to providing capacity assurances or that the scheme
38. 42 U.S.C. § 9604(c)(9) (1988). See also infra notes 212-221 and accompanying
text for a thorough discussion of the capacity assurance mandate.
39. Illinois has filed its capacity assurance plan with the EPA. The plan was
submitted to the EPA on October 17, 1989. The EPA directed states to indicate
sufficient capacity by showing the intent to site new facilities and implementation of
waste minimization programs. Illinois assured capacity. DIVISION OF LAND POLLUTIoN
CONTROL,

ILLINOIS

ENvn.

PROTECTION AGENCY,

CAPACITY ASSURANCE

PLAN

52-97

(October 17, 1989) [hereinafter ILL. CAP] (projecting adequate capacity for disposal
of hazardous waste through the year 2009, except in the category of energy recovery).
The report highlights Illinois waste minimization legislation and efforts but excludes
discussion of present and future siting potential. This critical exclusion is made more
significant by the IEPA's inclusion of facilities seeking permits but which have no
guarantee of becoming operational. Id. at 55. The data provided in this plan conflicts
with evidence from other IEPA reports about the potential for siting hazardous waste
treatement, storage, and disposal facilities. IEPA SITING REPORT, supra note 15, at 950. Moreover, the study uses nothing more than pure speculation regarding the ability
to assure capacity through alternative treatment technologies. The IEPA suggested
that incinerators would meet the demand for wastes presently landfilled but subject
to the landfill ban. ILL. CAP, supra at 62-63. However, the report fails to inform the
federal EPA of the state's problems with siting incinerators. See, e.g., Laurie Goering,
Notice of Robbins Incinerator Didn't Meet State Law, State Suit Says, Cm. TRm.,
December 14, 1991, § 1,at 5.
40. Capacity Assurance Plans for States Termed 'Paper Exercise' by Illinois
Official, 20 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 28, at 1267-68 (Nov. 10, 1989) (quoting Harry A.
Chappel, manager of the compliance section, Div. of Land Pollution Control, IEPA).
41. See infra notes 212-13 and accompanying text.
42. See discussion infra parts II(B) and II(C).
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inappropriately frustrates developers' plans for meeting the need.
B.

THE ILLINOIS SITING SCHEME

In 1975, the Illinois Supreme Court issued a declaratory judgment

that a local ordinance imposing conditions on a landfill, which had

been authorized by the Illinois Environmental Protection Agency
(IEPA), was preempted by a statewide, unified permitting program

and, thus, invalid. 43 The court ruled that a condition in the IEPA
permit which required operators to comply with local land-use ordi-

nances was an improper delegation of responsibility from the state
agency to localities." In 1981, the General Assembly of Illinois re-

sponded to public outcry against the court's ruling by enacting Senate
Bill 172 .4 Amending the Illinois Environmental Protection Act,4
Senate Bill 172 granted counties and municipalities authority to ap47

prove sites for various waste management landfills and facilities.
All waste permitting is governed by Title X of the Illinois Environmental Protection Act." Facilities designated as Regional Pollution
Control Facilities (RPCF) must seek approval pursuant to the Act. 49
Illinois courts have interpreted the statute to include local approvals

for any horizontal or vertical expansions of pre-existing facilities.50
43.
44.
45.
Disposal
46.
47.

Carlson v. Village of Worth, 343 N.E.2d 493, 496 (Il1. 1975).
Id.
An Act Related to the Location of Sanitary Landfills and Hazardous Waste
Sites, P.A. 82-682 (Nov. 12, 1981).
ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 111 1/2, paras. 1001-61 (1991).
ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 111 1/2, para. 1039.2(a) (1991).
48. ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 111 1/2, paras. 1039-41 (1991).
49. Id. ch. 111 1/2, para. 1039(c) (1991). A Regional Pollution Control Facility
is defined as:
[A]ny waste storage site, sanitary landfill, waste disposal site, waste transfer
station, waste treatment facility or waste incinerator that accepts waste from
or that serves an area that exceeds or extends over the boundaries of any
local purpose unit of government .... The following are not regional pollution control facilities: (1) sites or facilities located within the boundary of
a local general purpose unit of government and intended to serve only that
entity; (2) waste storage sites regulated under 40 CFR, Part 761.42; (3) sites
or facilities used by any person conducting waste storage, waste treatment,
waste disposal, waste transfer or waste incineration, or a combination thereof,
for wastes generated by such person's own activities ...
ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 111 1/2, para. 1003.32 (1991).
50. M.I.G. Investments, Inc. v. Illinois Envtl. Protection Agency, 523 N.E.2d
1 (I11.
1988). Considering an above-ground vertical expansion of an existing landfill,
the court held that the expansion affected the siting criteria stating: "it is clear that
the legislature intended to invest local governments with the right to assess not merely
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The law was designed to grant home-rule units of government authority
to regulate waste facility siting concurrently with the state.5' The
procedures contained within the Act are exclusive." The system for
granting permits is bifurcated with authority divided between the

Illinois Environmental Protection Agency and local county boards or

the governing body of an unincorporated municipality." This bifurcated process grants localities a great deal of discretion with only

limited direction .5For waste generators who treat or process waste on
site, the process may become trifurcated because they must also gain

local zoning and other land use approvals." The procedures for seeking
county board approval emphasize local, public participation. 6 For

example, an applicant initiates the approval process by written notifi-

cation to all property owners within 250 feet of a boundary of a
proposed site and to members of the General Assembly from the
district. 7 The applicant next files a copy of the proposal with the
county board that is then made available for inspection."8 Furthermore,
the location of proposed landfills, but also the impact of alterations in the scope and
nature of previously permitted landfill facilities." Id. at 4. Below ground vertical
expansions have also been deemed to fall within the approval process. Bi-State
Disposal, Inc. v. Illinois Envtl. Protection Agency, 561 N.E.2d 423 (11. App. Ct.

1990).

51. Donald J. Moran, Environmental Controls, ILLINOIS LAND USE LAW, ILL.

INST. FOR CONrnNUING LEGAL EDUC., 5.26, at 5-37 (1989). General powers of home

rule units are listed in the Illinois Constitution. ILL. CONST. art. 7, § 6. Powers of
non-home-rule units are contained in § 7.
52. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111 1/2, para. 1039.2(g) (1991) ("The siting approval

procedures, . . . provided for in this Act for new regional pollution control facilities
shall be the exclusive siting procedures .... Local zoning or other local land use

requirements shall not be applicable to such siting decisions.").
53. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111 1/2, para. 1039(c) (1991).

54. Joseph C. Gergits, Comment, Enhancing the Community's Role in Landfill

Siting in Illinois, 1987 U. ILL. L. REv. 97, 110.
55. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111 1/2, para. 1039(c) (1991) (providing in pertinent
part: "[E]xcept for new regional pollution control facilities governed by section 1039.2
... the granting of a permit under this Act shall not relieve the applicant from
meeting and securing all necessary zoning approvals from the unit of government
having zoning jurisdiction over the proposed facility."); see also discussion infra part
I(C) regarding judicial interpretation of this clause.
56. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111 1/2, paras. 1039.2(b)-(d) (1991). Illinois courts have
recognized the policy rationale for public participation in the siting process. "The
siting approval provision protects the public interest in having significant changes in
land use subject to scrutiny by its elected representatives." Browing-Ferris Industries,
Inc. v. Illinois Pollution Control Bd., 468 N.E.2d 1016, 1018-19 (I1. App. Ct. 1984).
57. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111 1/2, para. 1039.2(b) (1991).
58. Id.
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the public is allowed to file written comment on the proposal any time
prior to thirty days after the last public hearing.5 9 The statute further
mandates at least one public hearing after general notice of the hearing
has been published.60 The express purpose of the hearing is to "develop
a record sufficient to form the basis of appeal of the decision ....,,6,
The siting statute lists ten criteria to be considered by local boards
in siting approvals. 62 Overall, the criteria are not technically specific.
Some of the criteria call for a "public preference decision" based
upon subjective judgment of the county board. 63 One author noted
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. para. 1039.2(d).
62. Id. para. 1039.2(a).
The county board of the county or the governing body of the municipality,
as determined by paragraph (c) of Section 39 of this Act, shall approve or
disapprove the request for local siting approval for each regional pollution
control facility which is subject to such review. An applicant for local siting
approval shall submit sufficient details describing the proposed facility to
demonstrate compliance, and local siting approval shall be granted only if
the proposed facility meets the following criteria:
(i) the facility is necessary to accommodate the waste needs of the area it is
intended to serve;

(ii) the facility is so designed, located and proposed to be operated that the
public health, safety, and welfare will be protected;
(iii) the facility is located so as to minimize incompatibility with the character
of the surrounding area and to minimize the effect on the value of the
surrounding property;
(iv) the facility is located outside the boundary of the 100 year flood plain
or the site is flood-proofed;
(v) the plan of operations for the facility is designed to minimize the danger
to the surrounding area from fire, spills, or other operational accidents;
(vi) the traffic patterns to or from the facility are so designed as to minimize
the impact on existing traffic flows;
(vii) if the facility will be treating, storing, or disposing of hazardous waste,
an emergency response plan exists for the facility which includes notification,
containment, and evacuation procedures to be used in case of an accidental
release;
(viii) if the facility is to be located in a county where the county board has
adopted a solid waste management plan, the facility is consistent with that
plan; and
(ix) if the facility will be located within a regulated recharge area, any
applicable requirements specified by the Board for such areas have been met.
Id. Although the statute numbers only nine, the addition of general language allowing
county boards to consider the developer's previous record makes ten.
63.

MICHAEL

B.

WITTE,

TECHNICAL CONSIDERATIONS

CONTROL FACILITIES

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY AND NATURAL RESOURCES,

RELATING TO THE SITING OF NEW REGIONAL POLLUTION

30 (1984).
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the absence of technical requirements and suggested that the Pollution
Control Board (PCB) review of county decisions promotes lack of
consideration by the county of critical data. 4
Recently, however, Illinois appellate courts have interpreted the
criteria as charging the county with technical considerations concerning
public health and safety. 65 In Waste Management of Illinois, Inc. v.
Illinois Pollution Control Board,6 the court held that criterion (ii)
mandates consideration of technical information.
We believe this provision clearly and unambiguously provides
that the county board is empowered to consider all the public
health, safety and welfare ramifications surrounding the design,
location and operation of the proposed facility. Adopting
Waste Management's position would vitiate the fact-finding
authority granted to the county board . .. because technical
information of varying degrees must be addressed in order for
the local authority to assess the effect the proposed facility will
[W]e conhave on the public health, safety and welfare ....
clude that the county board does have the authority to consider
any and all of the technical details associated with the landfill
67
siting decision.
While the Waste Management court made a forceful argument that
technical information should be considered, neither the statute nor
prior court decisions lend guidance as to the type and scope of
information which should be gathered and reviewed. Moreover, the
realities are that counties do not possess the technical support necessary
to make such determinations and county board members lack technical
expertise. 8
While the statutory criteria do suggest that technical data should
be considered, this author questions whether it is appropriate for
county boards, comprised of laypersons, to consider such complex
matters. County review of complex technical specifications subjects
permit applicants to double review of such matters. The review is
64. Gergits, supra note 54, at 122.
65. See, e.g., McLean County Disposal, Inc. v. County of McLean, 566 N.E.2d
26, 28 (I11.App. Ct. 1991-). Ironically, after pronouncing that the county should
consider technical data, the court held that the county board was under no obligation
to heed the recommendations of its technical advisor. Id. at 33.
66. 513 N.E.2d 592 (I11.App. Ct. 1987).
67. Waste Management of Ill., Inc. v. Illinois Pollution Control Bd., 513 N.E.2d
592, 594-95 (I11.App. Ct. 1987).
68. See Gergits, supra note 54, at 123.
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needlessly duplicative and is more appropriately delegated solely to the
IEPA. Additionally, imposing a complete technical review in the first
instance requires the permit applicant to invest large amounts of time,
money, and resources in technical support of a proposal for siting
long before there is any real possibility that such investments will be
worthwhile. 69 The level of review suggested by the Waste Management
court is actually counterproductive to meaningful public participation.
Rather than hearing from concerned citizens about the immediate local
impact on the surrounding community, county boards will be immersed
in technical data. Citizens may not be inclined to participate in county
hearings if the review focuses on technical matters because most citizens
are ill-equipped to comment on such matters in a meaningful way.
Thus, Illinois courts have complicated the siting review at the local
level and have further distorted the original goal of the Act to provide
a unified, statewide system for waste disposal. Extending technical
review to the local level is one problematical aspect of the role played
by the Illinois courts.
C. THE ROLE OF ILLINOIS COURTS

Illinois courts have added substantive meaning to the siting criteria. All statutory criteria must be considered and met before approval
will be deemed valid.70 If the applicant fails to meet one criterion, the
reviewing authority need not consider other criteria which were met. 7'
The courts have considered at least five criteria on appeal either from
approvals or denials of the county board.
The first criterion, need for the facility, has been frequently
litigated. The applicant defines the area intended to be served by the
facility. 72 The applicant is not required to show "absolute necessity"
69. See Stotts, supra note 17.

70. McLean County Disposal, Inc. v. County of McLean, 566 N.E.2d 26, 28

(Ill. App. Ct. 1991); Metropolitan Waste Systems, Inc. v. Pollution Control Bd., 558
N.E.2d 785, 787 (I11.App. Ct. 1990); Waste Management of Ill., Inc. v. Pollution
Control Bd., 530 N.E.2d 682, 689 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988).
71. See Waste Management of Ill., Inc. v. Pollution Control Bd., 543 N.E.2d

505, 507 (II. App. Ct. 1989). After the court affirmed the McHenry County Board's

(MCB) denial of the Waste Management application on criterion (ii), Waste Management repetitioned the county for approval. MCB again denied the petition based upon
failure of the applicant to fulfill criteria (ii) and (iii). During the hearing on the second
petition, the record generated from the first petition was incorporated. In the present
appeal, Waste Management asserted that criterion (iii) had been established according
to the doctrine of collateral estoppel. The court held that Waste Management had
waived its right to assert collateral estoppel by failing to assert it before the MCB and
by offering additional testimony regarding the criterion at the hearing. Id. at 507-08.
72. Metropolitan Waste Systems, 558 N.E.2d
at 787.
/
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for the facility." Rather, "the applicant must show his landfill is
reasonably required by the waste needs of the area, taking into
consideration its waste production and disposal capabilities. ' 74 Neither
must the applicant eliminate every other potential location in the
area. 71 Present and future capacity in the county as well as capacity
of nearby facilities may be considered. 76 Urgent need and convenience

can be established by factors such as little life expectancy remaining,

no prospect of future expansion at other facilities, and potential for
increase in garbage generated. 77 While the courts have added some

specificity to the need requirement, there is no concrete guidance for

the county. This leaves open the possibility for arbitrary decisions by
local boards as to criterion (i), and the concurrent possibility that the.
denial may not be substantially related to an important local objective.
Likewise, judicial interpretation of criterion (ii), concerning the
determination that a facility protects health, safety, and welfare, has
led to arbitrary and irrational results. 78 In intermediate reviews of local

73. Id.
74. Wabash & Lawrence Counties Taxpayers & Water Drinkers Ass'n v. Pollution Control Bd., 555 N.E.2d 1081, 1085 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990).
75. Id.
76. Waste Management of Ill., Inc. v. Pollution Control Bd., 530 N.E.2d 682,
691 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988) (affirming county finding that nine year capacity was sufficient
for the present time. The Board's calculation included the opportunity to use existing
facilities outside the county.). Allowing the county board to make capacity determinations makes little sense when one considers that the state is not even capable of
accurately predicting capacity. The reader should also note that the board was relying
upon exports to other areas in order to preserve its own capacity. Because McHenry
County borders Wisconsin, it may have been utilizing out-of-state facilities. County
boards should be leery of measuring remaining capacity based upon exports to
bordering states because of the possibility that they may soon be disallowed.
77. Tate v. Illinois Pollution Control Bd., 544 N.E.2d 1176, 1195 (Ill. App. Ct.
1989).
78. Consider, for example, the following statement made by a reviewing court
about the PCB's affirmance of a local board denial for a site:
The petitioners assert that the opinions expressed by the City's expert witness,
Dr. Nolan Aughenbaugh, have no recognized scientific basis. Dr. Aughenbaugh stated that ... the site is underlain by a continuous system of vertical
fractures that extends all the way to the St. Peter sandstone protecting the
St. Peter acquifier [sic]. . . . We note that this St. Peter sandstone overlays
the entire State of Illinois. Therefore, according to Dr. Aughenbaugh's
theory, there is no way to build a safe landfill in the State of Illinois. It is
the PCB, however, that is the governing body properly designated with the
duty to weigh credibility, or lack thereof, of such witnesses. . . . [S]ince it is
not our function to determine which witnesses are more expert than others,
• . . we are of the opinion that the PCB's decision as to criterion (ii) will
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siting decisions, the PCB originally interpreted this criterion narrowly
79
as involving only factors affecting the site above ground level.
However, the courts, through decisions like Waste Management, have
transformed the inquiry into one which involves technical subsurface
factors. Citizen opposition groups now retain experts to testify as to
technical matters such as leachate into groundwaters. 0 The courts
typically defer to the county board's findings on such issues involving
public health without a substantial review of the technical data."' One
attorney, who is heavily involved in siting litigation in Illinois, noted
"[t]he court has even held that the localities' own technical standards
may be stricter than the IEPA's or PCB's requirements" and concluded
"[t]his virtually limitless authority under criterion (ii) conveys effective
veto power over local siting to county boards and municipalities. "82
When considering criterion (iii), minimizing incompatibility with
the surrounding area, courts are likely to be deferential to local
appraisals of the impact a facility will have. Again, county boards are
free to accept testimony either that the site is incompatible and that
property values are likely to decrease or that there would be no
depreciation. There simply are no hard and fast guidelines. 8 3 Generally,
"[t]his criterion requires an applicant to demonstrate more than minimal efforts to reduce the landfill's incompatibility. An applicant must
demonstrate that it has done or will do what is reasonably feasible to
minimize incompatibility.' '
There is less room for conflicting testimony regarding the 100
year floodplain requirement. Previously, the statute required the Illinois Departmbnt of Transportation to certify that the site was not
within the floodplain. However, the required IDOT certification was
deleted from the statute. No preferred method for certifying the
stand.

Metropolitan Waste Systems, Inc. v. Pollution Control Bd., 558 N.E.2d 785, 787-88
(Ill. App. Ct. 1990).

79. Waste Management of Ill., Inc. v. Board of Supervisors of Tazewell County,
47 POLL. CONTROL BD. Op. 485, 494 (Aug. 5, 1982).
80. E.g., A.R.F. Landfill, Inc. v. Pollution Control Bd., 528 N.E.2d 390 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1988).

81. Id. at 397.

82. Moran, supra note 51, at 5-48 (citing McHenry County Landfill, Inc. v.
Illinois Envtl. Protection Agency, 506 N.E.2d 372 (I11.App. Ct. 1987)).
83. Moore v. Illinois Pollution Control Bd., 561 N.E.2d 170, 179 (Ill. App. Ct.
1990) (affirming a rare siting approval noting that the applicant's witness had testified

that the impact to the surrounding community would be negligible and that property
values were unlikely to decline).
84. File v. D & L Landfill, Inc., 579 N.E.2d 1228, 1236 (I1. App. Ct. 1991).
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floodplain was inserted."5 It remains unclear what evidence that the
floodplain requirement has been met should be considered by the
county board.
The sixth criterion, impact on traffic flow, has been debated by
the appellate courts. It has been interpreted to require only that the
applicant demonstrate that the facility design minimizes impact on
traffic and danger to motorists.86 Testimony is given regarding line of
sight to access drives, speed limit on abutting streets, width and
7
condition of roads, and likely changes in traffic patterns.
Criterion (ix), compliance with county waste management plans,.
has not been specifically litigated in the appellate courts. However,
the language allowing counties to impose their own waste management
plans upon private developers is closely linked to the courts' interpretation of criterion (ii). Counties are authorized to impose technical
requirements which are more stringent than those imposed by either
the PCB or the IEPA. ss County plans often include recommendations
that specific technologies be implemented by the waste facility developer in order to protect groundwater from contamination, that designs
incorporate screening around the facility as desired by adjoining
landowners, that the facility meet operating requirements beyond those
established by IEPA and PCB regulations, and that traffic be routed
and roads constructed and maintained at the expense of the developer."
These plans may incorporate by reference siting regulations of the
IEPA.9 This requirement raises an important issue for practitioners:
whether an independent determination of compliance with IEPA technical regulations constitutes an improper delegation of authority to the
county board. Whether or not the courts will validate criterion (ix) in
an as-applied challenge, it is clear that waste facility developers and
operators 9l face substantial negative consequences from duplicative
review.
85. Moore v. Illinois Pollution Control Bd., 561 N.E.2d 170, 177-78 (I11.App.

Ct. 1990).
86. Fairview Area Citizens Taskforce v. Illinois Pollution Control Bd., 555

N.E.2d 1178, 1186 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) (noting that it would be impossible for

applicants to eliminate all traffic hazards).

87. McLean County Disposal, Inc. v. County of McLean, 566 N.E.2d 26, 32
(Ill. App. Ct. 1991).
88. McHenry County Landfill, Inc. v. Illinois Envtl. Protection Agency, 506
N.E.2d 373, 381 (Il1.App. Ct. 1987).
89. See, e.g., MCHENRY COUNTY BOARD, GUIDELINES FOR A NEW SOLED WASTE
DISPOSAL FAcILITY IN McHENRY COUNTY, ILLINOIS 12-18 (Sept. 18, 1990) [hereinafter
MCHENRY GUIDELINES].
90. Id. at 12.
91. The criterion may also apply to presently existing facilities if counties adopt
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Practitioners should also note that county plans may require
significant exactions 92 from the site developer. For example, a plan
may require the developer to make value assurances to adjoining
property owners or pay into a general fund for county purposes. 93
Additionally, the county may condition the permit on assurances that
the property will be used for specific purposes upon post-closure of
the facility. 4 Practitioners would be wise to review carefully countyspecific waste management plans for the existence of these exactions
and other requirements such as restrictions on transfer of ownership. 95
Thus, Illinois courts have taken an aggressive posture in promoting
local participation in the siting of waste facilities. Incrementally, their
decisions have charged county boards with ultimate decision-making
authority and have defined the statutory criteria expansively. Moreover, the statutory scheme offers little chance that an adverse siting
decision will be reversed on review for several reasons.9 First, the
county board must "develop a record sufficient to form the basis of
appeal," must reduce its decision to writing, must specify the reasons
for its decisions based upon the statutory criteria, and must act within
180 days after the application is filed.97 Despite the mandatory language
in the statute requiring the board to state reasons for granting or
denying an application, the courts have held that boards need not give
specific reasons. 9 In fact, board members are not required to review
the record generated by the hearing before rendering a decision.9
Obviously, when the county does not consider the record nor state its
reasons for denial, the applicant is required to speculate about the real
reasons in subsequent reviews.
local plans which authorize continual monitoring of operations and which apply
retroactively.
92. As used herein, "exaction" means impact fees, financial or other conditions
which are imposed upon prospective land developers for "public amenities" either
related or unrelated to the effect a particular development may have on the community..
For a discussion of exactions and incentive zoning, see Jerold S. Kayden, Zoning for
Dollars: New Rules for an Old Game? Comments on the Municipal Art Society and
Nollan Cases, 39 J. URn. CONTEMP. L. 3 (1991). See also discussion infra parts III(B)(C) for analysis of the use of exactions in the waste site permitting process.
93. MCHENRY GUIDELINES, supra note 89, at 4, 20.
94. Id. at 19.
95. Id. at 17.

96. See infra notes 97-109 and accompanying text.
97. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 111 1/2, paras. 1039.2(d)-(e) (1991).
98. E & E Hauling, Inc. v. Pollution Control Bd., 451 N.E.2d 555, 577-78 (Il.
App. Ct. 1983), aff'd, 481 N.E.2d 664 (Il1. 1985).
99. City of Rockford v. County of Winnebago, 542 N.E.2d 423, 430 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1989).
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Second, review by the Pollution Control Board of adverse local
decisions is granted as a matter Of right subject to a thirty-five (35)
day time limitation for filing petitions. 00 After notice, the PCB
conducts a hearing which "shall be based exclusively on the record
before the county board."'' ° Although the petitioner is charged with
the burden of proof, no additional testimony or evidence is allowed.1°2
The PCB must consider the record, the county's written reasons, and
the "fundamental fairness of the procedures used by the county
board."' 0 3 The PCB applies the against the manifest weight of the
evidence standard of review. "[A] decision is contrary to the manifest
weight of the evidence only if the opposite result is clearly evident,
plain, or indisputable from a review of the evidence." 1°4 Applicants
who have been denied permits have suggested that the PCB should
have greater discretion because of its "informed knowledge and technical expertise." 1o5 Rejecting this contention, courts have emphasized
that the legislature intended local governments to decide site suitability
and that the fact-finding function should remain on the local level. 3 6
This deferential standard of review prevents the PCB from reversing
local denials even when, in its imminent technical wisdom, it might
have found that the statutory criteria were met. Again, in a regulatory
scheme which imposes strict technical guidelines on developers, it
strains reason to suggest that decision-making should be vested in
government officials lacking technical expertise.
Third, review of PCB decisions is granted as a matter of right to
the appellate court in the district where the facility is located when the
applicant files a petition within thirty-five (35) days of a final PCB
order. °7 The reviewing court is "limited to a determination of whether
100. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 111 1/2, para. 1040.1(a) (1991).
101. Id.
102. Id. This provision has been labelled a "procedural anomaly" because it
places a trial-like burden of proof on the petitioner but the limited review of the
record mimics appellate procedure. The review procedure has been further muddled
by a refusal by the PCB to hear oral arguments. MORAN, supra note 51, at 5-46.
103. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. Ill 1/2, para. 1040.1(a) (1991).
104. File v. D & L Landfill, Inc., 579 N.E.2d 1228, 1232 (11. App. Ct. 1991)
(citing Tate v. Illinois Pollution Control Bd., 544 N.E.2d 1176, 1195 (111. App. Ct.
1989) and conducting extensive review of applicant's expert testimony and comparing
county's lack of expert testimony).
105. Waste Management of Ill., Inc. v. Illinois Pollution Control Bd., 513 N.E.2d
592, 596 (II1. App. Ct. 1987).
106. See, e.g., id. The court noted that the PCB is not merely a "rubber stamp"
for county boards. But the court only cited to three PCB reversals. Id. at 596-97.
107. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 111 1/2, para. 1041(a) (1991).
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the administrative agency's decision is contrary to the manifest weight
of the evidence, and as such, a reviewing court should not reweigh the
conflicting testimony."'' 8 Holding that the providence of granting or
denying a waste permit is primarily a matter of assessing credibility,
the appellate courts have consistently refused to reweigh evidence or
reassess credibility of expert witnesses.'09
The original goal of the Illinois siting statute - to promote public
participation by vesting limited authority to approve sites in local
boards - has been transformed into a system in which technically
correct siting gives way to blind public opposition. The appellate courts
in Illinois have promoted the transformation actively and with little
regard for original legislative intent. While almost everyone would
agree that the siting process should incorporate some method of public
participation, the current scheme grants citizens too much power over
the process. The manner in which the statute promotes public participation has been criticized because the public can influence board
1
members, but they have no role in which to provide thoughtful input." 0
The Illinois Pollution Control Board reviews the influence of
public opposition on county board members as part of the fundamental
fairness finding required by the statutes."' In City of Rockford v.
Winnebago County Board,"2 the PCB considered a local decision
which was ripe with procedural infirmities. The PCB held that the
process employed by the county board was unfair for three reasons:
(1) bias of county board members, (2) substantial ex parte contacts
with members of Save The Land, Inc., and (3) board members acted
in their legislative rather than quasi-judicial roles by considering evidence outside the record." 3 Although the opinion notes egregious
108. Metropolitan Waste Systems, Inc. v. Pollution Control Bd., 558 N.E.2d
785, 787 (111. App. Ct. 1990); see File v. D & L Landfill, Inc., 579 N.E.2d 1228, 1232
(Ill. App. Ct. 1992) (noting that the court would not substitute its own judgment or
reweigh evidence presented by experts even where evidence is conflicting); Moore v.
Illinois Pollution Control Bd., 561 N.E.2d 170, 177 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) (holding that
reassessing the evidence or credibility of witnesses lies within the expertise of the
hearing board); City of Rockford v. Illinois Pollution Control Bd., 465 N.E.2d 996,
998 (I1. App. Ct. 1984) (refusing to recognize that purpose of statute was to create a
statewide program ensuring "ecologically sound regional pollution control facilities").
109. E.g., Fairview Area Citizens Taskforce v. Illinois Pollution Control Bd.,
555 N.E.2d 1178, 1185 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990).
110. See Gergits, supra note 54, at 124.
111. City of Rockford v. Winnebago County Bd., 83 POLL. CONTROL BD. OP.
47, 55 (Nov. 19, 1987) (citing ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 111 1/2, para. 1040.1 (1991)).
112. 83 POLL. CONTROL BD. OP. 47 (Nov. 19, 1987).
113. Id.at 75.
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abuse of the process by the citizen group and board members, the
PCB remanded for reconsideration by the county, excluding four
board members who wore Save The Land buttons during the previous
hearings. 4 Two dissenting voices questioned the propriety of the
remand, noting that the entire statutory scheme had broken down and
was endangering the state's ability to provide waste disposal capacity. "5
The force of public opposition is also apparent in appellate
opinions reviewing siting denials." 6 In Waste Management of Illinois
v. Pollution Control Board,"7 the court rejected the applicant's argument on appeal that the board members had excess ex parte contacts
with citizens, because the applicant was unable to prove that the
contacts were anything more than expression of public sentiment about
the site." 8 Although the court recognized that the strong public op114. Id. at 76-77.
115. Id. at 87-97. Both dissenters thought that the Winnebago County hearing
was so unfair that the procedural failures could .not be cured by a remand to the
county. Id. The dissenters went on to comment on the overall breakdown of the
statutory siting statute. J. Meyer explained that the city of Rockford has been seeking
approval for the site since 1970 to no avail. Id. at 95. He implies that the problem
with the siting scheme is widespread and calls for the state to again vest the siting
function in the IEPA. Id. at 97. The following summary of his comments supports
this author's view that the state must seek a new process:

Illinois is facing a very serious waste disposal problem. A recent Agency
report states that the average life of remaining landfill space in the state is
5.3 years.... It is now almost impossible for a unit of local government to
approve the siting of a new regional pollution control facility, regardless of
the practical consequences. ...
There is no question in my mind that the county's decision in this case
was irrevocably tainted by ex parte contacts ....

A remand does not cure

the fact that the county board decision was a result of a fundamentally
unfair process.
In sum, this case points out the failure of the. legislature, this Board,
the courts, and local government to effectively deal with the pressing problem
of solid waste disposal ....

The local site approval process ...

has relieved

the pressure from the state and placed it on local government. The response
of local government has simply been to refuse to allow almost any new
regional pollution control facilities. We must remedy this situation before
our solid waste disposal problem becomes a true nightmare.
Id. at 97 (Meyer, J., dissenting).
116. See City of Rockford v. County of Winnebago, 542 N.E.2d 423, 431 (I1.
App. Ct. 1989) (holding that public opposition to a facility will not render a county
board's denial of approval void unless the applicant can prove that public opposition
was the sole reason for the denial).
117. 530 N.E.2d 682 (I1. App. Ct. 1988).

118. Waste Management of Ill., Inc. v. Pollution Control Bd., 530 N.E.2d 682,

697 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988).
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position could have some effect on the board members in their
adjudicatory role, the contacts did not make the hearing "fundamentally unfair."1 9 Rather than finding that public opposition had tainted
the siting process, Illinois courts have consistently noted that the statute
requires public participation and that the intensity of that participation
20
will not form the basis for reversal of local decisionmakers.1
The objectivity of local, elected officials on this issue has been
questioned. 121 The courts have been unwilling to find that the bias has
so affected a board member that reversal of the decision is necessary.
In A.R.F. Landfill, Inc. v. Pollution Control Board, 22 appellants
presented newspaper quotes from county board members which exhibited extreme preadjudication prejudice against siting any landfill. One
member was quoted as saying: "We need to start speaking out. We
need to stand up and say, if eight saints stand on their heads, I still
won't vote for a landfill.' 12a Nevertheless, the court did not find that
the process was fundamentally unfair. 124 Important to the court's ruling
for appeal by failing to
was that the appellant had waived this basis
125
bias.
asserted
make timely objection to the
The evidence that Senate Bill 172 has vested local authorities with
too much power over siting of RPCFs is substantial. The Supreme
Court of Illinois recently compounded the mistake made by the Illinois
General Assembly. Prior to the enactment of the sweeping amendments
to the Illinois Environmental Protection Act, the Illinois Supreme
Court, in County of Cook v. John Sexton Contractors Co., 26 held
that even if the IEPA issued an operating permit, local jurisdictions
exercising home-rule authority could exclude facilities through zoning
ordinances. However, the power was withheld from non-home-rule
units of government. 27 The central focus of the dispute was concern
that granting non-home-rule units authority would undermine statewide, uniform siting standards. The issue was presented to the court
119. Id. at 698.
Inc. v. Pollution Control Bd., 463 N.E.2d 969,
120. Waste Management of Ill.,
974 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984).
121. See Gergits, supra note 54, at 125.
App. Ct. 1988).
122. 528 N.E.2d 390 (Ill.
123. A.R.F. Landfill, Inc. v. Pollution Control Bd., 528 N.E.2d 390, 392 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1988).
124. Id. at 394.
125. Id. at 394.
126. 389 N.E.2d 553 (Ill. 1979), superseded by statute, Village of Carpentersville
1990).
v. Pollution Control Bd., 553 N.E.2d 362 (Ill.
127. County of Cook v. John Sexton Contractors Co., 389 N.E.2d 553, 556 (111.
1979).
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numerous times before it was finally put to rest in Village of Carpentersville v. Pollution Control Board.'
Rather than taking the necessary step of reducing local control
over environmental matters, the Illinois Supreme Court's interpretation
of section 39(c) of the siting act has increased the potential for conflict
between federal, state, and local policy. In fact, Village of Carpentersville allows local zoning ordinances to preempt uniform state
29 The
laws. 1
facts in this case show how the conflict between regulations
may deprive an owner of a valuable property interest. The appellant,
Cargill, Inc. manufactured resins, a by-product of which was a hazardous waste water which emits a noxious odor. 130 Pursuant to EPA
recommendations, Cargill closed its facility to improve emission controls on its liquid waste incinerator. The Agency required Cargill to
increase its stack height to 100 feet.' 3 ' However, the Village had an
aesthetic height restriction of 35 feet and would not grant Cargill a
variance. 3 2 The court affirmed the zoning restriction despite its conflict
with statewide standards for emission controls.' 33 The conflict between
state and local standards left Cargill between a rock and a hard place,
unable to operate its manufacturing process after making substantial
investment in it. The decision has been criticized because "the court's
expansive view of local powers overlooks clear limitations on local
authority that are still found throughout the Act and that have been
acknowledged by at least one other court." 1' 34
Two arguments made by Cargill, and summarily dismissed by the
court, are explored further by this author in Parts II and III. The
Village of Carpentersville Court simply refused to consider Cargill's
128. 553 N.E.2d 362 (Ill. 1990).
129. Village of Carpentersville v. Pollution Control Bd., 553 N.E.2d 362, 367
(Ill.
1990). The court stressed that it was not reversing its prior stance on the issue,
but that it was interpreting an amendment to 39(c) which indicated that the legislature
no longer intended the Act to override local zoning.
Thus, the General Assembly has determined that, under the Act, the zoning
powers of local governmental units, both home and non-home-rule, should
be broader than the minimum powers to share concurrent jurisdiction with
the State that are provided for in section 6 of article VII.

Id.

130. Id. at 363.

131. Id.

132. 553 N.E.2d 362, 363 (Ill. 1990).
133. Id. at 364-65.

134. James L. Wright, Environmental Regulation by Local Government After
Village of Carpentersville v. PCB, 79 ILL. B.J. 502, 529 (1991). Author cites to

significant legislative history omitted by the Supreme Court of Illinois.

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 12

argument that the result of the court's interpretation of 39(c) would
be in conflict with federal environmental legislation which could
35 The
jeopardize future state receipt of superfund reimbursements.
court also denied Cargill's claim that the statute, as interpreted, results
in an unconstitutional taking of its property. The court stated that the
statute did not effect a taking, rather the taking could only occur if
the Village refused to grant a variance.' 36 Thus, the court recognized
that a subsequent refusal by the Village of a variance could result in
a taking of Cargill's property. Whether the federal preemption argument or the takings claim, if fully developed and argued in future site
denials, will be successful in future litgation by commercial waste
developers will be analyzed in Parts II and III of this comment.
Thus, Part I demonstrated how the Illinois legislature and Illinois
courts have placed waste generators and site developers between a rock
and a hard place. The following parts of this comment analyze whether
those commercial entities can squeeze out of that position by asserting
constitutional constraints to the current siting scheme.

II.

FEDERAL PREEMPTION OF STATE AND LOCAL SITING RESTRICTIONS

The current power of local governments in Illinois to frustrate
siting may be constrained in the future by federal preemption of that
power. Because regulation of the environment by various levels of
37
government has created inherent "political frictions"' and frustrated

national policy objectives, 3 ' practitioners facing adverse siting decisions should consider the preemption doctrine as a ground for appeal.

135. 553 N.E.2d at 368. The court noted that "it is extremely unlikely that the
scenario envisioned by Cargill will occur." Id. It further stated that even if the
argument were true, the problem could only be addressed at the legislative level. Id.
See discussion infra Part I1for this author's argument- that the court could have
addressed the problem by employing federal preemption analysis.
136. Village of Carpentersville v. Pollution Control Bd., 553 N.E.2d 362, 367
(Ill. 1990). The reader should note that the court was apprised of the fact that Cargill
had already been refused a variance by the Village. Id. at 363.
137. Robert E. Manley, Federalism and Management of the Environment, 19
URB. LAW. 661, 666 (1987) (recognizing political frictions between various levels of
government in environmental policy-making and calling for standards at the macro
(federal) level and more cooperation from components of the micro level (states,
localities, and administrative agencies)).
138. See Reilly, supra note 10, at 68-69; Roger D. Schwenke et al., Local Control
of Hazardous Wastes Through Land Use Regulations, 21 REAL

PROP. PROB.

TR. J.

603, 606 (1986); Jonathon Phillip Meyers, Comment, Confronting the GarbageCrisis:
Increased Federal Involvement as a Means of Addressing Muncipal Solid Waste
Disposal, 79 GEO. L.J. 567, 586 (1991).
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Preemption issues may arise in siting litigation because federal, state,
and local governments each have their own peculiar regulatory concerns. When the local governments assume regulatory powers characteristic of federal concerns, the potential for conflict between regilations
is great and often leaves developers guessing about which regulation
or policy to follow 9 The potential for conflict is greatest when a
permit is sought because county boards and zoning authorities have
an interest distinct from federal and state technical considerations.
This part of the comment examines the conflict between the
national agenda to assure adequate disposal capacity and local veto
power over siting decisions. The analysis includes an overview of
general federal preemption placing emphasis on decisions interpreting
the preemptive effect of federal environmental statutes and regulations.
Next, the goals of two federal statutes, RCRA and CERCLA, are
compared with the Illinois siting scheme for potential conflict. Finally,
this part looks forward to the dual possibilities that Congress may
authorize states and/or localities to impose burdens upon the import
of wastes and may pass legislation which explicitly preempts local
control of siting. Such possibilities strengthen the argument that siting
statutes featuring local veto power conflict with federal goals of safe
and adequate waste disposal.
A. THE PREEMPTION DOCTRINE APPLIED TO ENVIRONMENTAL
STATUTES GENERALLY

Congress strikes the necessary balance between federal and state
powers; the role of the courts is to decide what balance Congress
intended.140 Thus, if Congress acts pursuant to an enumerated power,
any state or local legislation which conflicts with that act may fall
victim to the preemption doctrine.' 4' If Congress legislates on environmental matters, it regulates pursuant to its Commerce Clause 42 power
under the Constitution.13 The Commerce Clause, in combination with
139. See, e.g., supra notes 128-34 and accompanying text.

140. National Solid Wastes Management Ass'n, v. Alabama Dep't of Env't, 910

F.2d 713, 715 (lth Cir. 1990) (discussing the court's role in determining whether
Alabama's newly enacted "land disposal restrictions" (LDRs) were preempted by a
1984 RCRA amendment allowing the EPA Administrator authority to grant a variance
to the land disposal ban deadline), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2800 (1991).
141. See generally JOHN E. NOWAK ET AL., CoNsTTuIoNAL LAW § 9.1, at 295-

96 (3d ed. 1986).
142. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 ("The Congress shall have the power... (To]
regulate Commerce ... among the several States ... .

143. See Ruhl, supra note 14, at 301.
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the Supremacy Clause, permits Congress to preempt state and local
environmental regulation. This preemptive power is limited only by
the powers reserved to the states by the Tenth Amendment.'" "Although it is often difficult to draw the line where federal authority
ends and state police powers begin, the interstate effects of pollution
145
and development necessarily fall within the federal domain."'
Thus, the Supremacy Clause mandates that federal environmental
law will prevail over state and local law whenever there is a conflict.'"
Preemption issues may arise in a number of different ways. Federal
laws preempt conflicting state laws whenever Congress states its intent
to preempt state law. Congressional intent to preempt may be stated
in express terms in a given statute. 47 Because Congress rarely expresses
its intent to preempt in explicit terms, the Supreme Court has developed
several preemption "touchstones" to determine Congressional intent. '4
The Court employs several tests to infer Congressional intent.
Intent to preempt is found where Congress (1) pervasively legislates,
(2) has occupied a given field, or (3) where it may be found that there
49
is no room left for state supplementation of federal law. Congress

is not required to occupy the field and where a federal regulatory
50
scheme is not pervasive, states are free to regulate unoccupied areas.
However, an intention to preempt may be implicit even when Congress
has not regulated an entire field if state law conflicts with federal law.
A state law may conflict with federal statutes when it "stands as

an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes
and objectives of Congress."' But divergent purposes alone will not
144. U.S. CONST. amend. X ("The powers not delegated to the United States by
the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States
respectively, or to the people.").
145. Ruhl, supra note 14, at 304.
146. Jonathan R. Stone, Supremacy and Commerce Clause Issues Regarding
State Hazardous Waste Import Bans, 15 COLUM. J. ENvTL. L. 1, 5 (1990) (analyzing
environmental preemption and negative commerce clause cases and suggesting states
enter compacts for disposal of wastes to avoid "civil war").
147. See Exxon Corp. v. Hunt, 475 U.S. 355, 362 (1986); Jones v. Rath Packing
Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977).
148. Russell Chapin, Harmonizing Federal Preemption Doctrine with Garcia's
Cession of State and Local Interests to the Political Process, 23 URB. LAW. 45, 46
(1991).

149. See Wisconsin Public Intervenor v. Mortier, 111 S. Ct. 2476, 2484 (1991);
Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation and Development
Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 203-04 (1983); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S.
218, 230 (1947).
150. E.g., California Coastal Comm'n v. Granite Rock Co., 480 U.S. 572 (1987).
151. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941); see also Michigan Canners &
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form the basis for preemption. Rather, the test is whether both statutes
can stand "without impairing the federal superintendence of the
field .... 11"52 A variation on the impairment test is the impossibility
of dual compliance with both federal and state law.' The same tests
apply to federal regulations whenever Congress delegates responsibility
to administrative agencies to promulgate pervasive regulations in a
particular field. 5 4 The delegation to federal agencies may have a
preemptive effect over conflicting state laws or regulations even when
the agency has decided not to promulgate regulations in the field.' 55
No matter what preemption basis the Court uses in its analysis of
Congressional intent, the Court will not lightly trespass on traditional
state police powers and will find preemption only when Congress
expresses a "clear and manifest purpose."' 5 6 Historically, environmental regulation has been deemed a residual police power.' 57
Due to the groundswell of public sentiment favoring strict environmental regulation during the last decade,' Congress has entered
the arena of environmental regulation in a comprehensive manner.
Congress has passed many environmental statutes directed to the
Freezers Ass'n, Inc. v. Agricultural Marketing & Bargaining Bd., 467 U.S. 461, 469
(1984).
152. Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142 (1963).
153. Id. at 143. "A holding of federal exclusion of state law is inescapable and
requires no inquiry into congressional design where compliance with both federal and
state regulations is a physical impossibility for one engaged in interstate commerce."
Id. at 142-43 (citations omitted). When engaging the physical impossibility test, the
Court examines whether the specific regulated area is one in which national supervision
is critical or whether the subject is one which requires national uniformity. Id. at 14344.
154. See Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519 (1977) (leading case); see also
California v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 110 S. Ct. 2024 (1990); Hillsborough
County v. Automated Medical Laboratories, Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 713-20 (1985);
Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 248 (1984).
155. See, e.g., Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp. v. State Oil & Gas Bd.,
474 U.S. 409 (1986).
156. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
157. National Solid Wastes Management Ass'n v. Killian, 918 F.2d 671, 676 (7th
Cir. 1990) (citations omitted) (discussing federal regulation of environmental issues),
aff'd, Gade v. National Solid Wastes Management Association, See generally Ruhl,
supra note 14, at 303 ("[Plower to regulate land use within its boundaries has great
import for environmental law.").

158. U.S. citizens have adopted a "greener" attitude regarding their environment.
A 1988 Gallup poll determined that the public considered the environment the foremost
of all political issues and that a presidential campaign could rise or fall based upon
the candidate's environmental posture. Bill Kemp, Environmental Issues Come of Age
in the 1990's, ILL. IssuEs, Apr. 1990, at 13.
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widespread concern for the environment. Likewise, state and local
governments regulate in the field. "The resulting patchwork of legislation and regulation emerging from government at various levels and
reflecting different approaches to control has repeatedly generated
issues of federal preemption of state and local laws. ....19 Although

there are numerous and varied environmental statutes and regulations

at the federal level, Congress has not made its intent to occupy the

entire field of environmental law explicit nor has any court found that

Congress has implicitly occupied the field. ' 6° Therefore, waste management practitioners should analyze specific conflicts in the statutes
or regulations and resort to either the physical impossibility test or the
obstacle to national goals test. These bases for preemption in the
environmental field continue to be considered by the courts "statute6
by-statute.'" '
The two federal statutes under which the preemption argument
frequently arises are the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
(RCRA) 6 2 and the Comprehensive EnvironmentalResponse, Compensation and LiabilityAct (CERCLA). 63 Neither statute contains express,
unambiguous preemptory language. Congress has, therefore, plowed
a fertile field for preemption claims in the courts.IM Recent cases
discussing preemption in the environmental field generally are instruc159. Killian, 918 F.2d at 673 (citing International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479

U.S. 481 (1987)), aff'd, Gade v. National Solid Wastes Management Ass'n, 112 S.
Ct. 2374 (1992).

160. Id. at 673.

161. Id.
162. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992 (1988). RCRA is the primary statute regulating the
treatment, storage, and disposal of hazardous wastes. It defines certain categories of
wastes as "hazardous" and sets standards for the generation and transportation of
listed wastes. It further determines permit requirements for TSD facilities. RCRA has
been labeled a "cradle to grave" statute because its intent is to regulate waste from
the initial generation to the final disposal site through a manifest system. DANIEL P.
SELMI & KENNETH A. MANASTER, STATE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

§6.04(2), at 6-24 (1990)

(The authors devote chapter five of their treatise to various constitutional limits on
state environmental lawmaking.). As currently codified, RCRA embodies the Solid
Waste Disposal Act (SWDA) at subchapter IV, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6941-6949(a) (1988) and
therefore, also controls solid wastes at the federal level by requiring states to adopt
minimum standards.
163. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988). CERCLA is commonly known as the statute
which implements the Superfund program. It was designed to locate and remediate
the most dangerously contaminated sites in the country. The government is empowered
to order cleanup of the sites and seek reimbursement from potentially responsible
parties (PRPs).
164. See Stone, supra note 146, at 8-26 (offering a complete discussion of
preemption litigation under RCRA and CERCLA).
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tive for practitioners who intend to challenge state and local regulation.
A brief review of those cases follows, but practitioners should note
that preemption arguments are necessarily fact specific.' 65 The challenge should be directed at statutory language and construction of
specific portions of statutes or regulations. Specific statutory and
regulatory bases for preemption, under RCRA and CERCLA, of the
Illinois siting statute are outlined in the section following the review
of environmental preemption cases.
A RCRA preemption argument first reached the Supreme Court
in City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey.166 Several cities outside New
Jersey, as well as private landfill operators within the state, challenged
a New Jersey law which banned the importation of solid wastes. The
Supreme Court upheld a prior ruling by the New Jersey Supreme
Court that the statute was not preempted by related federal environ67
mental statutes.

Since City of Philadelphia, lower courts have addressed many
RCRA preemption arguments because the statute allows room for
supplemental state laws and local ordinances. The statute envisions a
cooperative federal/state partnership in the field of solid waste. States
are permitted to develop their own regulatory scheme as long as it
meets minimum federal standards and is generally consistent. 61 Moreover, RCRA contains a statutory "savings" provision which reserves
in states some regulatory authority over hazardous wastes.

69

States

165. NowAK, supra note 141, § 9.3, at 297.
166. 437 U.S. 617 (1978).

167. City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 620 n.4 (1978). The Court
relegated its preemption analysis to note 4 finding "no 'clear and manifest purpose
of Congress' to pre-empt the entire field of interstate waste management, either by
express statutory command or by implicit legislative design." Id. (citations omitted).
However, the Court did strike the New Jersey ban under Commerce Clause analysis.
See infra notes 227-30 and accompanying text.
168. 42 U.S.C. § 6926 (1988).

169. 42 U.S.C. § 6929 (1988).
Upon the effective date of regulations under this subchapter no State or
political subdivision may impose any requirements less stringent than those
authorized under this subchapter respecting the same matter as governed by
such regulations, except that if application of a regulation with respect to
any matter under this subchapter is postponed or enjoined by the action of
any court, no State or political subdivision shall be prohibited from acting
with respect to the same aspect of such matter until such time as such
regulation takes effect. Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to prohibit
any State or political subdivision thereof from imposing any requirements,
including those for site selection, which are more stringent than those imposed
by such regulations. Nothing in this chapter (or in any regulation adopted
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must also adopt minimum standards for regulating solid wastes and
are prohibited from allowing open dumps. 70
Pursuant to the RCRA savings provision, states have imposed
more stringent regulations generally and have attempted to impose
local bans on disposal specifically. The provision is ambiguous about
the extent of state authority to undermine national objectives.' 7' This
ambiguity has spurred litigation over the scope of the provision 72 and
debate about whether it ultimately allows state and local governments
73
to restrict permitting and disposal.
Lower courts have reached different conclusions over the meaning
of the savings clause and the authority of states to impose absolute
restrictions on disposal. 74 In Rollins Environmental Service, Inc. v.
Parish of St. James,175 the Fifth Circuit invalidated a local ordinance
which constructively prohibited the plaintiff from operating a transfer,
storage, and disposal (TSD) facility for polychlorinated bi-phenols
(PCBs). The court found that the ordinance improperly constituted a
de facto ban on disposal of PCBs in frustration of Congressional
objectives.' 76 Relying upon Rollins, the Southern District of California
enjoined San Diego from enforcing a local ordinance which required
a conditional use permit for the operation of a hazardous waste

Id.

under this chapter) shall be construed to prohibit any State from requiring
that the State be provided with a copy of each manifest used in connection
with hazardous waste which is generated within that State or transported to
a treatment, storage, or disposal facility within that State.
170. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6941-6949a (1988).
171. Stone, supra note 146, at 22.
172. See George F. Gramling, III & William L. Earl, Cleaning Up After Federal

and State Pollution Programs: Local Government Hazardous Waste Regulation, 17
STETSON L. REV. 639, 672 (1988) (reviewing sources of local regulatory power and

addressing the various levels of preemption).
173. Stone, supra note 146, at 25 (providing a discussion of the legislative history
of the savings clause and concluding that the clause was not intended to allow states
to enact import bans).
174. Compare Ensco, Inc. v. Dumas, 807 F.2d 743 (8th Cir. 1986) (holding that
the section 3009 "savings clause," allowing states to impose more stringent requirements, means only that state and local governments may adapt laws to meet local
conditions but may not subvert federal objectives) with Sharon Steel Corp. v. City of
Fairmont, 334 S.E.2d 616 (W. Va. 1985) (holding that RCRA did not preempt an
ordinance restricting waste from a coking plant because common-law nuisance theory
was preserved).
175. 775 F.2d 627 (5th Cir. 1985).
176. Rollins Envtl. Servs., Inc. v. Parish of St. James, 775 F.2d 627, 635-36 (5th
Cir. 1985).
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incinerator in Ogden Environmental Services v. City of San Diego.'7
The issue before the court was whether the city, in good faith, denied

the conditional use permit based upon peculiar local conditions. The
court held that a denial based upon generalized concern about health,
safety, and welfare was preempted by federal policy favoring the
development of such facilities .178
The success of a federal preemption argument in the area of waste
facility siting seems to depend upon whether a particular court will
find that Congress intended RCRA to be a national agenda which
overrides state and local concerns. In addition to Rollins and Ogden,
one other court has noted that RCRA is a "national regulatory scheme,
even though that scheme is not on its face preemptive (of State

programs)."

179 Other

courts have held that the savings clause prevents

preemption of state and local law. 180

The preemption doctrine remains central to litigation involving
state and local waste import bans and other restrictive acts. For

example, in National Solid Wastes Management Association v. Ala-

bama Department of Environmental Management,8' the Eleventh
Circuit Court of Appeals held that the 1984 amendment to RCRA,

authorizing the EPA to establish effective dates for variances to the
land disposal ban, pre-empted an Alabama statute, which became
82
effective prior to federal EPA mandate and prohibited land disposal.

The court reasoned that Congress intended the authority to vary the
177. 692 F. Supp. 1222 (S.D. Cal. 1988).
178. Ogden Envtl. Servs., Inc. v. City of San Diego, 692 F. Supp. 1222, 1225

(S.D. Cal. 1988). "[Tihe city's response ... ignores the significant overlay of
important federal legislation and national interests .... This court's role is not simply

to review the City's action under the deferential substantial evidence standard which
is traditionally invoked by state courts when reviewing local land use decisions." Id.
at 1224.
179. Hazardous Waste Treatment Council v. South Carolina, 766 F. Supp. 431,
435 (D.S.C. 1991) (finding that the problem was national in scope and that new
facilities were needed and required under RCRA's overall mandate).
180. See North Haven Planning & Zoning Comm'n v. Upjohn Co., 921 F.2d 27
(2d Cir. 1990) (holding that RCRA does not preempt zoning regulation of "cap" on
chemical waste pile), aff'g per curiam, 753 F. Supp. 423 (D. Conn. 1990); accord
Clean Harbors of Braintree, Inc. v. Board of Health, 570 N.E.2d 987, 990 (Mass.
1991); Celebrezze v. Environmental Enterprises, Inc., 559 N.E.2d 1335, 1341 (Ohio
1990) (holding that "mere inconsistency" of Ohio laws with federal regulations did
not require displacement of state program where plaintiff failed to allege physical
impossibility of complying with dual regulations).
181. 910 F.2d 713 (11th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S.Ct. 2800 (1991).
182. National Solid Wastes Management Ass'n v. Alabama Dep't of Envtl.
Management, 910 F.2d 713, 724 (11th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S.Ct. 2800 (1991).
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effective date of the land ban to rest solely with the federal EPA. The
pretreatment capacity determination was to be made on a "nationwide
basis" to avoid civil war." 3 Under the present state of the law, it is
likely that state and local governments will try to avoid preemption
claims by tailoring laws within the savings clause of RCRA. Because
many courts have followed the Supreme Court's lead in City of
Philadelphiaby invalidating state laws on Commerce Clause grounds,
preemption issues are seldom reached.'1
The Supreme Court has recently shown a willingness to review
cases involving federal preemption of state and local environmental
regulation. In Wisconsin Public Intervenor v. Mortier,8 5 the Court
held that local regulation of pesticides was not preempted by the
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) because
Congress had not manifested its intent to supplant local regulation,
because it had not occupied the field, and because the court found no
actual conflict in the regulations.18 6 Mortier provides guidance regarding the Court's current position on the preemption doctrine as applied
to environmental regulation. The Court focused on the lack of explicit
preemptory language, limited the statutory construction inquiry, and
required an actual physical impossibility rather than a conflict in goals
approach.1 17 The Court recently decided another environmental preemption case involving a conflict between state licensing of hazardous
waste workers and OSHA. 8'
B. CONFLICT BETWEEN THE NATIONAL GOALS OF SAFE AND
ADEQUATE WASTE DISPOSAL AND LOCAL OPPOSITION TO SITING IN
ILLINOIS

Although the Supreme Court has never construed federal environmental statutes to imply Congressional intent to occupy the entire field
183. Id.
184. E.g., BFI Medical Waste Systems, Inc. v. Whatcom County, 756 F. Supp.
480, 486 (W.D. Wash. 1991).
185. 111 S. Ct. 2476 (1991).
186. Wisconsin Public Intervenor v. Mortier, 111 S. Ct. 2476, 2482-87 (1991).
187. Id. (relying primarily on language establishing a regulatory partnership
between the levels of government and holding that the federal goal of promoting
technical expertise was insufficient to preempt the local pesticide ordinance).
188. Gade v. National Solid Wastes Management Ass'n, 112 S. Ct. 2374 (1992).
A plurality of the Justices in part II of the opinion held that the Illinois licensing act
for hazardous waste workers was "impliedly preempted" "[by OSH Act Section 18(b)]
as in conflict with the full purposes and objectives of the . . . Act." Id. at 2383. A
majority of the Court agreed in part III of the opinion that the dual impact of the
licensing statute - promote public safety as well as occupational safety - did not
save the state statute from federal preemption. Id. at 2388.
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of environmental regulation, it has not foreclosed arguments grounded
upon other bases of the preemption doctrine. Specifically, the door
remains open to the argument that the Illinois siting statute conflicts
with the national goals of safe and adequate waste disposal because
the effect of the statute is to grant local governments constructive veto
power over the development of new facilities. National goals related
to siting waste facilities are currently embodied in RCRA and CERCLA. This section examines the issue of whether the effect of public
participation in local siting requires the state siting statute to yield to
the federal objectives established by RCRA and CERCLA.
Congress stated the national policy and objectives underlying
RCRA. 8 9 It desired to create a federal/state partnership for carrying
out hazardous waste management in an environmentally sound way. 19
Congress also sought to provide for the promulgation of guidelines
for solid waste management.' 9' Despite its call for cooperation among
Federal, State, and local governments, Congress stated the national
policy to be, in pertinent part: "Waste that is nevertheless generated
should be treated, stored, or disposed of so as to minimize the present
and future threat to human health and environment."' 92 This policy
statement implies that Congress was aware that sites for disposal would
continue to be necessary even if recovery technology became successful.
Promotion of new waste management facilities is implicit in the
national objectives.
Under subchapter three, pertaining to hazardous wastes, states
may develop their own programs in lieu of federal programs, including
permitting programs. 93 Requirements for state-administered permitting
have been promulgated by the EPA.' 94 Illinois has received final
authorization for select portions of its hazardous waste regulatory
program. 95 The EPA divides authorization into three categories: fully
incorporated, authorized but not incorporated, and not authorized.
Some of the state regulations are incorporated by reference into the
federal statute and are enforceable by the federal EPA. Portions of
the Illinois's siting statute are selectively authorized but not incorporated by reference.' 96 Significantly, the sections of Title X of the
189. 42 U.S.C. § 6902 (1988).
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.

Id. § 6902(a)(7).
Id. § 6902(a)(8).
Id. § 6902(b).
42 U.S.C. § 6926(b) (1988).
See 40 C.F.R. §§ 271.12-.14 (1991).
40 C.F.R. § 272.701(a)(1) (1991).
Id. § 272.701(a)(2)(i)-(ii).
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Illinois Environmental Protection Act which apply to permitting of
RPCFs and require local approval are not authorized. 97 Illinois's siting
statute, discussed in Part I, is designated as broader than the federal
program and is not authorized. 98 This fact should be considered
significant to the practitioner who appeals a siting denial on the basis
of preemption because the exclusion of the siting statute from federal
approval may imply that the statute contravenes national policy which
encourages development of new, environmentally sound facilities.
Likewise, the goal of subchapter four of RCRA, pertaining to
nonhazardous solid waste, is to provide a comprehensive federal
program to assist states in implementing plans which promote sound
disposal practices. I'9 Congress directed the EPA Administrator to
promulgate guidelines to achieve that objective. 2°° The guidelines provide instruction to states for developing plans consistent with RCRA
objectives. 20' The guidelines require general state assurances of adequate disposal capacity. 20 2 An approved state must submit an annual
work program which includes plans to increase the number of facilities. 203 To assure the EPA that no open dumping will be encouraged,
states must demonstrate that they have adequate regulatory power and
plans to meet disposal needs. 20 Thus, a waste permit applicant who is
unsuccessful in the Illinois permitting process may argue that the entire
siting scheme is preempted by the national goal of adequate disposal
facilities and the regulatory directives to states requiring development
of new facilities.
However, it remains less than clear that a siting statute which
emphasizes public participation is an obstacle to the implementation
197. The only subsections of the Illinois permitting statute which are approved
are ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111 1/2, paras. 1039 (a),(d),(g),(k). See 40 C.F.R. §
272.701(a)(2)(i) (1991). The portion of the statute construed in Village of Carpentersville, ch. 1039(c), is not specifically authorized.
198. 40 C.F.R. § 272.701(a)(2)(ii)(A) (1988).
199. 42 U.S.C. § 6941 (1988); see also id. § 6943(a)(6).
200. Id. § 6942(b).
201. The guidelines are codified at 40 C.F.R. §§ 256.01-256.65 (1991).
202. Id. § 256.01(b)(4),(6).
203. Id. § 256.05(d)(2).
204. Id. § 256.40-41(a).
In order to comply with section 4003(6), the State plan shall provide for
adequate resource conservation, recovery, storage, treatment and disposal
facilities and practices necessary to use or dispose of solid and hazardous
waste in an environmentally sound manner.
Id. § 256.40. Meeting the adequacy requirement entails assessing statewide need for
new facilities. Id. § 256.41.
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of federal objectives. The possibility that a reviewing court would not
find the siting act preempted is strong because RCRA also mandates
some public participation; it, however, suggests only minimum guidelines. 2 5 The method to encourage public participation under RCRA
differs significantly from the Illinois scheme. For example, RCRA
envisions a permit process which is initiated at the state level for a
technical review of the permit application. Public participation is
encouraged to a limited degree only after the applicant has met all
technical requirements. Notice and an opportunity for a public hearing
at the local level is provided after a State agency completes its review.20
A specific guide for public participation during permitting has been
promulgated by the EPA and requires a public hearing "if the State
determines there is a significant degree of public interest in the

proposed permit.'

'27

The recommended method to encourage public participation differs vastly from Illinois's current method.2 Although the EPA has
2
clearly stated that public participation serves important objectives, 0
it is equally clear that neither Congress nor the EPA intended local
participation to result in absolute veto of new facilities. In the final
analysis, this preemption argument may fail because the guidelines for
public participation are minimal requirements and may be subject to
the RCRA savings provision. But if the permit applicant can demonstrate that the Illinois siting statute has the effect of granting local
veto power and could deprive the state of necessary disposal capacity,
then there may be a chance that a court will find the preemption
argument persuasive. 210 Considering the requirement for public participation equally with other sections of RCRA suggests that too much
local power may stand as an obstacle to attainment of national
21
obj ectives. '
205. 42 U.S.C. § 6974(b) (1988).
206. Id.
207. 40 C.F.R. § 256.63 (1991).
208. See id. § 256.65(a) (calling for an "advisory group [with a] balanced
viewpoint in accord with 40 CFR 25.7(c)"). The advisory group is suggested as an aid
to local or state decisionmakers, in part, to "foster a constructive interchange among
the various interests present ... and enhance the prospect of community acceptance

of agency action." 40 C.F.R. § 25.7(b) (1991). The advisory group should be composed
of equal membership from four sectors: private citizens, public interest groups, public
officials, and citizens with economic interests in the project. Id. § 25.7(c).
209. 40 C.F.R. § 25.3 (1991).
210. Cf. Envirosafe Servs. of Idaho, Inc. v. County of Owyhee, 735 P.2d 998,
1002-03 (Idaho 1987) (recognizing the concern of local citizens but invalidating local
regulation of hazardous waste because it conflicted with statewide objectives).
211. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 6926(0 (1988) (requiring that information distributed
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State and local attempts to avoid additional siting of waste
facilities may also run afoul of CERCLA. CERCLA was amended in
1986 by the Superfund Amendments and ReauthorizationAct (SARA)','
which established a deadline for state assurance of sufficient capacity
for treatment and disposal of hazardous wastes generated over the
next twenty years. 21 3 Congress opened the door permitting states to
fashion their own solutions either by increasing disposal capacity within
the state or by entering interstate compacts for export of wastes to
neighboring states.21 4 This method of delegating some authority to the
states while preserving federal review authority under the threat of
Superfund money withdrawal has fanned the interstate waste-ban
25
fire. 1
States, struggling to meet federal capacity assurance requirements
to insure Superfund monies, have tried to maintain capacity by banning
imports or discouraging imports by placing a moratorium on new
facilities. In fact, some states, to keep imports out, have prevented
development of commercial facilities entirely.2 6 This response is not
defensible because the nation suffers from a capacity shortage. 2 7 Under
to the public by the state or substate agency be given "in the same manner as, and to
the same degree as if the [EPA] was carrying out provisions of this subchapter in such
state'")(emphasis added).
212. 42 U.S.C. § 9604 (1988).
213. (9) Siting- Effective 3 years after October 17, 1986, the President shall
not provide any remedial actions pursuant to this section unless the State in
which the release occurs first enters into a contract or cooperative agreement
with the President providing assurances deemed adequate by the President
that the State will assure the availability of hazardous waste treatment or
disposal facilities which
(A) have adequate capacity for the destruction, treament, or secure
disposition of all hazardous wastes that are reasonably expected to be
generated within the State during the 20-year period following the date of
such contract or cooperative agreement and to be disposed of, treated or
destroyed,
(B) are within the State or outside the State in accordance with an
interstate agreement or regional agreement or authority,
(C) are acceptable to the President, and
(D) are in compliance with the requirements of subtitle C of the Solid
Waste Disposal Act.
42 U.S.C. § 9604(cX9) (1988).
214. Id.
215. See generally Douglas J. Snyder, The EPA-North Carolina Dispute: The
Right to Pass Stricter Laws Under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 8
VA. J. NAT. REs. L. 171, 189 (1988) (providing a detailed factual account and legal
analysis of North Carolina's defensive move to preserve its own capacity).
216. See Senate Hearings II, supra note 3.
217. See Senate Hearings I, supra note 3.
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SARA's mandate for capacity assurances, Illinois waste companies
may be able to overcome adverse local siting decisions by urging the

preemption doctrine.
A state siting statute which effectively prevents siting is repugnant
to a national policy objective of encouraging siting of new facilities.
However, like RCRA's language, SARA's mandate may be construed
as ambiguous and prevent courts from holding that it preempts local
siting processes.218 Despite the ambiguity, the EPA has promulgated

regulations concerning federal aid in the remediation of state Superfund sites based upon SARA assurances. 219 Moreover, the EPA published suggested criteria which indicate that if shortfalls in capacity
appear in a state submission, then the state must be able to assure
that state and local laws will not impede additional capacity development.m In addition to the ambiguity contained in the amendments to
CERCLA, the uncertain method of measuring capacity provided by
Congress may render the preemption analysis unpersuasive at this
time."'
C.

THE FUTURE OF PREEMPTION DOCTRINE AS APPLIED TO SITING

DENIALS IN ILLINOIS

Although RCRA and the SARA mandates may not presently
supply the necessary Congressional intent to preempt local siting
denials, emerging trends in state protectionism and the possibility of
a more explicit statement from Congress increase the likelihood that a
preemption argument will successfully overcome a siting denial in the
future. In response to shrinking disposal capacity and the federal
218. See Stone, supra note 146, at 26. Citing significant legislative history of
SARA, this author concluded that SARA was intended to address the NIMBY
problem. "Mhe process of site selection should find a way to transcend blanket local
vetoes. No Community should be able to remove itself from consideration on political
grounds alone." Id.
219. See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. § 35.6105(b) (1991); 40 C.F.R. § 300.510(e) (1991).
220. Draft State Hazardous Waste Capacity Assurance Guidance, 53 Fed. Reg.
33,618, 33,654 (1988).
221. Illinois received federal approval of its first capacity assurance plan on May
7, 1990. On February 15, 1992, Illinois submitted its revised plan for approval to the
EPA. The EPA is currently considering the revised plan. The capacity assurance
provision of SARA is not being administered as a real mandate at the present time
due to the extreme differences in methodologies used by the various states in making
their assurances. The EPA does not consider it prudent to withhold superfund money
from states at the present time. However, the EPA continues to work with the states
to improve data collection and analysis. Once the projections are found to be reliable,
there is a possibility that the mandate will be enforceable. Telephone interview with
Karen Lumino, Region V EPA, (Mar. 5, 1992).
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capacity assurance mandate, many states and localities have attempted
to preserve capacity by imposing burdens on imported wastes or
banning imports altogether. As more states attempt to protect their
waste disposal resources, the pressure to allow such protectionism
mounts. If states are allowed to ban imports in the near future, Illinois
may be forced to alter its siting process to favor increased siting of
new facilities.
Again, Congress regulates the environment under the authority
222
granted to it by the Commerce Clause. Even when Congress does
not exercise its powers to regulate the environment in a specific area,
states may be precluded from enforcing laws which have the effect of
223
impeding the free flow of interstate waste. When the Supreme Court
applies a dormant Commerce Clause analysis, it will employ one of
224
three methods, depending upon 226whether the law is protectionist,
22
discriminatory, or evenhanded.
The Supreme Court, in City of Philadelphia,designed the framework for dormant Commerce Clause analysis to be applied to state
laws banning the importation of wastes. First, where a law exhibits
patent economic protectionism, "a virtual per se rule of invalidity has
been erected. ' 227 In determining whether the New Jersey import ban
violated the dormant Commerce Clause, the Court implicitly acknowledged a legitimate local purpose, 228 but went one step further by
recognizing that "the evil of protectionism can reside in legislative
means as well as legislative ends." 2 9 Thus, even if a state has a
legitimate purpose, where the means discriminate on the basis of the
origin of the article of commerce, the law will be invalid. The Court
such laws would have on the
took note of the effect that upholding
20
wastes.
of
management
interstate
222. City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
223. Cf. Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 471 (1981)
(referencing environmental laws as "an area of legitimate local concern").
224. Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S: 511, 522 (1935).
225. Hunt v. Washington State Apple Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333 (1977). "[W]e need
not ascribe an economic protection motive to the North Carolina legislature to resolve
this case; we conclude that the challenged statute cannot stand insofar as it prohibits
the display of Washington State grades ....

"

Id. at 352-53.

226. Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 471-72 (1981).
227. City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978).
228. Id. at 625.
229. Id. at 626.
230. Today, cities in Pennsylvania and New York find it expedient or
necessary to send their waste into New Jersey for disposal, and New Jersey
claims the right to close its borders to such traffic. Tomorrow, cities in New
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In the ten years following the City of Philadelphia decision, the
lower federal courts applied the dormant Commerce Clause analysis
with varying results.23 ' However, analysis of the more recent cases
illustrates that, in most instances, the lower courts rely on the benchmark decision in City of Philadelphia. States and localities attempt to
circumvent City of Philadelphia with legislation that professes to
advance local environmental goals. Most of the measures are clearly
protectionist and are urged either to assure future capacity for their
own citizens to the detriment of interstate commerce or to prevent the
political suicide of siting new waste facilities. Seven states have recently
23 2
attempted to enforce protectionist measures to no avail: Alabama,
Jersey may find it expedient or necessary to send their waste into Pennsylvania
or New York for disposal, and those States might then claim the right to
close their borders. The Commerce Clause will protect New Jersey in the
future, just as it protects her neighbors now, from efforts by one State to
isolate itself in the stream of interstate commerce from a problem shared by
all.
Id. at 629. Ironically, Justice Stewart accurately predicted the future events. Pennsylvania is now one of the states leading the quest to move Congress to grant states
authority to ban waste imports because New Jersey is overburdening its landfills. See
Senate Hearings II, supra note 3, at 29 (Statement of New Jersey Governor James J.
Florio).
231. Stone, supra note 146, at 18-22. Stone traces the cases from 1978 forward,
and additional discussion of the lower federal court cases during that time frame is
not necessary. This comment traces only the most recent commerce clause cases and
argues that the Philadelphia approach remains the prominent analytical tool to
invalidate state and local attempts to ban importation of wastes.
232. National Solid Wastes Management Ass'n v. Alabama Dep't of Envtl.
Management, 910 F.2d 713 (11th Cir. 1990), modified on other grounds, 924 F.2d
1001 (11th Cir. 1991) (invalidating "black list" of twenty-two states seeking to export
waste to Emelle, Alabama's hazardous waste disposal outlet on the same dormant
commerce clause analysis employed in City of Philadelphia), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct.
2800 (1991). But see Hunt v. Chemical Waste Management, Inc., 584 So. 2d 1367
(Ala. 1991) (holding that additional fee charged to out-of-state waste entities did not
violate the Commerce Clause), rev'd, 112 S. Ct. 2009 (1992). (Delivering the opinion
for the Court, Justice White relied upon City of Philadelphia to strike the $72.00
additional fee imposed upon out of state waste as facially discriminatory.) Id. at 2013.
Justice White was unconvinced that Alabama had proven unique or even legitimate
local purpose and concluded:
To the extent Alabama's concern touches environmental conservation and
the health and safety of its citizens, such concern does not vary with the
point of origin of the waste, and it remains within the State's power to
monitor and regulate more closely the transportation and disposal of all
hazardous waste within its borders. Even with the possible future financial
and environmental risks to be borne by Alabama, such risks likewise do not
vary with the waste's state of origin in a way allowing foreign, but not local,
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Indiana, 233 Louisana,234 Ohio,235 South Carolina,23 6 Georgia, 2 7 and
Washington.23 One industry representative summarized the result of
state protectionism: "The ultimate waste ban is to have no disposal
facility at all.''239
The many state and county attempts to restrict importation of
waste and prevent siting continue to be met with resistance by the
courts under the dormant Commerce Clause approach. Rather than
offering a real solution to a problem' increasingly national in scope,
political subdivisions are treating immediate symptoms with no real
plan to remedy the underlying disease. This ad-hoc approach is due,
partly, to the unclear federal environmental directives and partly to
political fear. Because pollution respects no boundaries, the search for
waste to be burdened.
Id. at 2015-16.
233. Government Suppliers Consolidating Servs., Inc. v. Bayh, 734 F. Supp. 853
(S.D. Ind. 1990) (granting preliminary injunction against enforcement of statute which
required out-of-state haulers to obtain certification from state health officers).
234. Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. Templet, 770 F. Supp. 1142 (M.D.
La. 1991) (holding that ban on Mexican wastes could not withstand constitutional
scrutiny because the waste traveled through Texas).
235. National Solid Waste Management Ass'n v. Voinovich, 763 F. Supp. 244
(S.D. Ohio 1991) (striking fees imposed upon imported wastes because the state's
taxing power was threatening to interstate commerce).
236. Hazardous Waste Treatment Council v. South Carolina, 766 F. Supp. 431
(D.S.C. 1991) (holding that there was no clear language in federal environmental
statutes which would authorize South Carolina to regulate waste to the detriment of
interstate commerce).
237. Diamond Waste, Inc. v. Monroe County, 939 F.2d 941 (11th Cir. 1991)
(invalidating a county ordinance designed to preserve landfill space because the
legitimate local interest could have been promoted by means having less impact on
interstate commerce).
238. BFI Medical Waste Systems, Inc. v. Whatcom County, 756 F. Supp. 480
(W.D. Wash. 1991) (rejecting county attempt to exclude out-of-county medical wastes
as discriminatory). But see Evergreen Waste Systems, Inc. v. Metropolitan Servs.
Dist., 820 F.2d 1482 (9th Cir. 1987)(upholding county-imposed ban as regulating instate and out-of-state wastes evenhandedly). State attempts to circumvent previous
rulings by instructing counties to ban waste from out-of-county to avoid also waste
moving in interstate commerce have now been halted by the Court's recent ruling on
the issue. Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Michigan Dep't Nat. Resources, 112
S. Ct. 2019 (holding that "a State ...may not avoid the strictures of the Commerce
Clause by curtailing movement of articles of commerce through subdivisions of the
State, rather than through the State itself."). Id. at 2024.

239. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act Oversight: Hearings Before the

Subcomm. on Hazardous Wastes and Toxic Substances of the Comm. on Environment
and Public Works, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 561 (1987) (Statement of Peter Varly,
Chairman, Institute of Solid Waste Disposal).
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a real solution should include interstate, interregional, and national
agendas.
In response to political pressure from the state level, Congress
may amend RCRA and CERCLA to authorize state restrictions on
waste imports. However, Congress is unlikely to surrender all control
over the issue and may pass legislation strengthening the capacity
assurance requirement. A grant of authority to the states tempered by
a concurrent requirement for capacity assurances may become the new
national waste management agenda. It is well-settled that Congress
may authorize states to regulate an article of commerce.m Under an
express grant of authority, states may regulate even if the regulations
would otherwise impermissibly burden interstate commerce.24 Congress has left windows in federal environmental legislation to allow
states some discretion to regulate.2 2 To date, however, it has not
expressly allowed states to manage wastes through import restrictions.
There are some indications that Congress may approve such
measures soon. In support of the movement to allow states to regulate
interstate transport of waste, Senator Coats (Indiana) urged, "[wje are
in a race between reform and crisis."' 3 In 1990, Coats attached a
"surprise amendment" to an appropriations bill which was ultimately
rejected in the conference committee. 2A Many senators from states
which have become "dumping grounds" have joined Senator Coats
with their support for legislation to allow state import bans.24 5 In the
102d Congress, Senators introduced eight bills which allow states
authority to impose import restrictions of various types. 24 House
240. White v. Massachusetts Council of Construction Workers, 460
U.S. 204, 213 (1983).
241. Id.
242. See supra notes 168-73 and accompanying text.
243. Solid Waste, 22 Env't Rep. (BNA) 485 (June 6,1991) (urging approval of
state authority to ban imports so that Indiana can extend the remaining life of its
landfills which is estimated at seven years for waste generated solely within the state).
244. Id. at 486.
245. Sponsors and co-sponsors of legislation to grant state authority to impose
import bans are listed by state, alphabetically, with party designation: AL-Shelby (D);
AZ-DeConcini (R); IA-Grassley (R); KS-Dole (R), Kassebam (R); KY-Ford (D),
McConnell (R); LA-Breaux (D), Johnston (D); MS-Lott (R); MT-Baucus (D), Burns
(R); NH-Smith (R); NM-Bingaman (D), Domenici (R); ND-Burdick (D); OK-Boren
(D); RI-Chafee (R); SC-Hollings (D), Thurmond (R); SD-Daschelle (D); UT-Hatch
(R); VA-Warner (R); WA-Gorton (R); WV-Rockefeller (D); WI-Kasten (R); WYSimpson (R). Search of LEXIS, LEGIS Libary, Bill Tracking Report file, Mead Data
Central, Inc. (Nov. 6, 1991) (search for sponsors of all current bills on the topic).
246. See S. 153, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); S. 175, 102d Cong., 1st Sess.
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members introduced thirteen similar bills .47

Senators have proposed bills which amend existing environmental
statutes and can be divided into two general categories. The first
category of bills grants state authority to either restrict imports outright
or to impose fees with few limitations4 8 In contrast, the second type
grants the states more limited authority in connection with imported
waste: the authority is often conditioned upon the states' compliance
with a long-term plan or upon a compact agreement with other states. 49
The House bills follow this same general line, and few grant the states
total authority. 250
The likelihood that one of these bills will survive the legislative

process and become law is slim. 25' However, Senate Bill 976, containing
comprehensive amendments to RCRA, remains alive in the legislative

process. 252 As currently written, the bill announces new Congressional
(1991); S. 197, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); S. 241, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); S.
592, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); S. 774, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); S. 976, 102d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); S. 1086, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
247. See H.R. 116, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); H.R. 173, 102d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1991); H.R. 592, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); H.R. 607, 102d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1991); H.R. 724, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); H.R. 739, 102d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1991); H.R. 816, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); H.R. 921, 102d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1991); H.R. 2216, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); H.R. 2380, 102d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1991); H.R. 2671, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); H.R. 3091, 102d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1991); H. 3235, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1991).
248. See S. 197, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. § 1 (1991) (allows states to impose fees in
connection with treatment or disposal of solid waste); S. 1086, 102d Cong., 1st Sess.
§ 5 (1991) (authorizing states which are in compliance with capacity assurances to
restrict hazardous waste imports and to impose fees on the basis of origin).,
249. See, e.g., S. 976, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) (RCRA reauthorization bill
granting states the power to restrict or prohibit imports upon a showing that the state
is in compliance with an approved solid waste plan and that the exporting state is not
in compliance); S. 175, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) (allowing states to enter regional
compacts and to restrict wastes from states not parties to the compact agreement after
a specified deadline).
250. See supra note 247 (statement based upon this author's review of House
bills in the current Congress).
251. Most of the bills, cited supra notes 246-47, that were introduced in the
102d Congress have less than a ten percent (10%) chance of success on either floor.
Mostwill die in committee. Search of WESTLAW, Federal, Billcast database, Information for Public Affairs, Inc. (Nov. 14, 1991) (These statements are based upon
author's search in the Billcast database of all current bills on the topic. The odds are
predicted based upon statistical research supplied by the Center for Public Choice,
George Mason University, and are not those of the author.). But see S. 1086 and
H.R. 607, Billcast (odds better than fifty percent that these two bills will meet with
approval on the House and Senate Floors). Id.
252. S. 976, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991). Senate Subcommittee on Environmental
Protection concluded hearings on the bill on March 5, 1992.
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findings which may lend support to preemption of local siting denials.
"[N]ew waste management facilities are not being sited and many
communities are managing waste in existing facilities without the best
available environmental controls, or are engaged in long-distance
transportation of wastes to other management and disposal facilities
'253
in other States, or both.
Furthermore, the bill amends subtitle D of the Solid Waste
Disposal Act to require a solid waste capacity assurance mandate as a
counterpart to the current hazardous waste requirement in CERCLA.
One national objective of the amendment is "to assist in developing
and encouraging permitted capacity pursuant to the permit requirements in section 4010, to meet the Nation's solid waste recycling,
treatment, storage, and disposal needs estimated pursuant to section
4003. ' '254 Under the proposed act, states will be required to demonstrate
a plan which "implements the national policy. '25 5 States must also
demonstrate that siting mechanisms will result in new municipal solid
waste management facilities. If local government is unable or unwilling
to site new facilities, the State must implement a binding mechanism
for overcoming local disputes .256 It is clear, therefore, that if enacted,
Congress will have stated more explicitly its intent to preempt state
and local laws which impede siting.
Finally, S. 976 proposes to amend RCRA to authorize importing
states to impose fees and other restrictions on imports from states not
in compliance with the new provisions. 257 A state is allowed to impose
fees only if the fees are applicable throughout the state and if the state
does not discriminate against particular facilities. 258 A state desiring to
further restrict imports must demonstrate full compliance with the new
25 9
mandates under section 4003 of the proposed act.
On one hand, a Congressional grant of state authority to restrict
imports may be adverse to Illinois because it currently is a major
exporter of solid and hazardous wastes. On the other hand, if Illinois's
neighbors ban Illinois' wastes, Illinois may respond by promoting the
siting of new waste facilities. However, if the state is to encourage
new sites, then it will have to remove the public opposition impediment
currently embodied in the siting statute. Attorneys litigating for com253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.

Id. § 101(a)(10).
Id. § 401(b)(3).
Id. § 402(e)(a)(1).
Id. § 402(e)(7)(A)-(B).
S. 976, 102d Cong., 1st Sess.
Id. § 4013(a)(2).
Id. at § 4013(b)(1)-(4).

§§ 4013(a)-(h) (1991).
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mercial waste developers should closely monitor activity in this Congress and the next to determine whether Congress has indeed granted
the states explicit authority to impose particular restrictions. Attorneys
should also be alert to new Congressional statements which may
provide better bases for application of the preemption doctrine to local
denials of waste permits. If Congress makes a clear statement that the
national objective is to increase technically sound disposal facilities,
then the Illinois siting statute, as currently interpreted and administered, will clearly be in conflict with that national goal.

III.

A

FIFTH AMENDMENT RESPONSE

To LocAL

SITING DENIALS IN

ILLINOIS

Just as practitioners appealing siting denials must watch for
developments in Congress which will strengthen their preemption
argument, they should also monitor developments in the jurisprudence
of regulatory takings. This is true because the Illinois siting statute is
little more than a state guide for local land-use decisions. Because the
statute provides for onerous local regulation of the siting process, the
Fifth Amendment may become prominent in litigation stemming from
waste permit denials. The very real connection between environmental
°
law and local land use law has been noted by several commentators.
Although the siting statute was passed as part of the state environmental regulatory scheme, practitioners should not overlook the argument that the statute regulates property. Nor should they ignore the
real possibility that a permit denial pursuant to the statute may give
rise to a claim against the government for just compensation.
This part of the comment makes the argument that recent Supreme
Court decisions involving the Fifth Amendment may have shifted the
analytical balance in favor of developers so that stringent regulations
of the siting process may now be scrutinized more closely. In Part
III(A), a brief review of the history of the regulatory takings doctrine
sets the stage for analysis of the validity of the statute as an exercise
of the state's police power. Whether the statute effects a taking depends
upon recent changes in the approach taken by the Supreme Court in
regulatory takings analysis. Part III(B) reviews the legitimacy of the
260. See 2 FRANK P. GRAD, TREATISE ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 10 (1990);
DANIEL R. MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW § 12 (1988 & Supp. 1991) [hereinafter

MANDELKER I]; Speary, Jr., supra note 26, at 2-1; Michael F. Reilly, Transformation
at Work: The Effect of Environmental Law on Land Use Control, 24 REAL PROP.
PROB. TR. J. 33 (1989); and Stephen Sussna, Remedying Hazardous Waste Facility
Siting Maladies by Considering Zoning and Other Devices, 16 URB. LAW. 29 (1984).
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statute as a health, safety, and welfare measure. Part III(C) considers
whether the adverse economic impact arising out of siting denials meets
the Supreme Court tests for compensable takings.
A.

HISTORY OF THE REGULATORY TAKINGS DOCTRINE

The Fifth Amendment provides in absolute terms "private property [shall not] be taken for public use, without just compensation.''261
Implicit in this language is the fundamental tension between state need
to protect public health, safety, and welfare and the secured position
of individual property rights. Resolution of the inherent tension in the
Fifth Amendment has been the subject of intense judicial inquiry. A
comparison of two early takings cases reveals the central theoretical
debate over the meaning of the clause.
In Mugler v. Kansas,262 the Court sustained a state statute prohibiting the manufacture or sale of liquor over the objections of the
plaintiff that the law substantially diminished the value of his property.
In broad, sweeping terms, Justice Harlan denied that the statute was
an exercise of eminent domain because he recognized the state's power
3
to regulate for the protection of the health and safety of its citizens. 26
The legitimacy of the exercise of the police power in prohibiting the
sale of liquor was analyzed according to the Court's substantive due
process principles.2 The Mugler Court focused upon the legitimate
purpose of the prohibition rather than on the denial of just compensation for violation of individual property rights. "Thus, a valid
exercise of the police power could never amount to a taking of
property, for it is the very exercise of the police power which defines
individual property rights.'' 26
Thirty-five years later, in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,20
Justice Holmes interpreted the clause to require state compensation
for regulations, even within a state's police power, which go "too far"
and deny landowners all use of their property. 267 While recognizing
that a state may regulate for the public good, Holmes admonished:
"We are in danger of forgetting that a strong public desire to improve
the public condition is not enough to warrant achieving the desire by
261. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
262. 123 U.S. 623 (1887).

263. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 661-62 (1887).

264. Id. at 669.

265. Susan E. Looper-Friedman, Constitutional Rights as Property?: The Supreme Court's Solution to the "Takings Issue", 15 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 31, 40 (1990).
266. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
267. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
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a shorter cut than the constitutional way of paying for the change ....
[T]his is a question of degree - and therefore cannot be disposed of
6
1 The statute construed by Justice Holmes
by general propositions.''2
prohibited the mining of coal in ways which might cause subsidence.
Finding the statute an unlawful exercise of the state's police power,
how far the power reaches
Holmes set the stage for the debate over
2 69
effected.
is
taking
compensable
a
before
Four years later, the Court was again called upon to decide how
far states may go in regulating land use pursuant to its police power.
In Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,270 the Court validated a
comprehensive zoning plan which had the effect of reducing the value
of the plaintiff's land because it was located within a tract which the
ordinance designated for residential development. 27' Although the Court
recognized that the value and marketability of the plaintiff's land
would be diminished, it held that the zoning in question was a proper
exercise of the police power because the landowner did not show the
zoning ordinance to be "clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, bearing
no substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general

welfare.'

'272

More recently, the Supreme Court has described the balancing
approach established by early takings cases as one which is fact
dependent: "The Takings Clause, therefore, preserves governmental
power to regulate, subject only to the dictates of 'justice and fairness."' 273 How rights should be balanced and which test should be
used have been a central focus of scholarly debate. One analysis has
274
suggested that balancing of rights may be the only rational method.
268. Id. at 416.
269. Id. at 413, 415.
270. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).

271. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 379-80 (1926).
272. Id. at 395.
Thus the question whether the power exists to forbid the erection of a

building of a particular kind or for a particular use, like the question whether
a particular thing is a nuisance, is to be determined, not by an abstract
consideration of the building or of the thing considered apart, but by

considering it in connection with the circumstances and the locality .... A
nuisance may be merely a right thing in the wrong place - like a pig in a

parlor instead of in the barnyard.

Id. at 388 (citations omitted).
273. Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65 (1979) (making the point that each case
under the clause involves an ad-hoc factual inquiry requiring more judgment than
application of logic).
274. See Frank Michelman, Takings, 1987, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 1600 (1988).
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Others have suggested that the test should involve inquiry into whether
the government is regulating uses which have external costs for society

such as those typically labeled a nuisance. 275 One scholar calls for a
literal interpretation of the Fifth Amendment to protect individual
property rights from all governmental regulation with the exception of
very limited exercise of the police power. 76 Yet another author maintains that the lack of a principled basis for deciding takings cases
277
presents special problems in light of expectations of property owners.
The Court has resorted to an arguably more structured test for

determining when a taking has been effected by government regulation.
While the Court continues to engage in balancing, a new element is
now factored into the analysis-the investment-backed expectation of

the property owner. 27s Drawing from Pennsylvania Coal, Justice Brennan equated the statute which made it impractical for the property
owner to mine coal with frustration of an investment-backed expectation when he wrote the majority opinion in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York. 279 In Penn Central, the plaintiff
Michelman reviews recent cases and scholarly criticism of the Court's failure to
develop a principled basis for deciding takings issues and concluded his analysis as
follows: "I would not take their vulnerability as sufficient reason to repudiate a ruleof-law ideal, but rather as a sign that balancing - or better, the judicial practice of
situated judgment or practical reason - is not law's antithesis but a part of law's
essence." Id. at 1629.
275. See Joseph L. Sax, Takings, Private Property and Public Rights, 81 YALE
L.J. 149 (1971) (maintaining that if property owners engage in activities that involve
costs for the public, the regulation is permissible. If no social costs are involved, the
government should be required to compensate the property owner for regulation which
deprives her of the best use.); see also Andrea L. Peterson, The Takings Clause: In
Search of Underlying Principles Part II- Takings as Intentional Deprivations of
Property without Moral Justification, 78 CAL. L. REv. 55 (1990) (seeking to explain
previous takings decision and to provide the court with a basis for deciding future
cases. Peterson's moral justification theory states that "a compensable taking occurs
whenever the government intentionally forces A to give up her property, unless the
government is seeking to prevent or punish wrongdoing by A.") Id. at 59.
276. RicHARD A.

EPSTEIN,

TAKINGS,

PRIVATE PROPERTY AND

THE

POWER OF

DoMAIN (1985) (maintaining that modern interpretations of the police power
are too broad and calling for "diligent judicial supervision in land use cases"). Id. at
263.
277. Susan Rose-Ackerman, Against Ad Hocery: A Comment on Michelman, 88
EMINENT

COLUM. L. REV. 1697 (1988) (pointing out the problems associated with the Court's

reliance on case-by-case determinations but not offering her own theory to solve the
ad hoc problem).
278. See generally Daniel R. Mandelker, Investment-Backed Expectations: Is
There a Taking?, 31 J. URa. CONT. L. 3 (1987) [hereinafter Mandelker II.
279. 438 U.S. 104, 127 (1978).
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alleged that a New York landmark preservation law had worked a
taking of its property by restricting its ability to improve its propertyGrand Central Terminal. 2s° Applying a three part test, Brennan held
that the law did not frustrate any distinct investment-backed expectation of the plaintiff because the plaintiff maintained a reasonable use
of the terminal2 8 '
In Agins v. City of Tiburon,"2 decided one year later, the Court
considered a California law which had the effect of downzoning the
plaintiff's property and thereby limited its development potential. The
Court assimilated prior holdings into a simple two-part test to be used
to determine whether a taking has occurred. "The application of a
general zoning law to particular property effects a taking if the
ordinance does not substantially advance legitimate state interests or
denies an owner economically viable use of his land. ' 2 3 The Court
determined that the law encouraging the development of open spaces
was substantially related to the purpose of protecting the citizens of
Tiburon from the ravages of urbanization. The Court did recognize
that development, would be limited but denied that the plaintiff was
prevented from making "best use" of the land or that a "fundamental
2
attribute of ownership" had been taken. 8
The cases analyzed above involve substantive questions arising out
of the application df the Fifth Amendment. Practitioners should not
ignore the procedural requirements fashioned by the Court. In particular, before the Court will decide whether a claimant's property has
been taken, it reviews whether the claim is ripe.
As the Court has made clear in several recent decisions, a claim
that the application of government regulations effects a taking
of a property interest is not ripe until the government entity
charged with implementing the regulations has reached a final
decision regarding the application of the regulations to the
property at issue. 85
280. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 113 (1978).
281. Id. at 124, 138. Factors to consider include the nature of the governmental
act or regulation, the economic impact on the property owner, whether the regulation

interferes with the owner's investment-backed expectation, and the character of the
regulation. Id. at 124-28.
282. 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
283. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980) (internal citations
omitted).
284. Id. at 262.

285. Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S.

172, 186 (1985) (citing Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, Inc.,
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The importance of insuring that a claim is ripe for a takings
determination cannot be overstated. The Court considers this threshold
matter important because the substantive factors cannot be analyzed
until the government entity has rendered a final decision on how it
will apply the regulations in question. 28 6 Thus, the ripeness issue
requires then both a final decision and exhaustion of state remedies,
which may include seeking a variance or filing an inverse condemnation
would be futile, the Court
action. However, whenever such attempts
2
will consider the substantive merits. 8
The historical Supreme Court cases demonstrate that several
factors should be considered by courts when called upon to decide
whether a taking has occurred. A court should look at whether the
government is acting pursuant to its traditional police power and
whether the means of effectuating that power are substantially related
to the identified purpose. Additionally, courts should inquire whether
the regulation being reviewed frustrates a distinct investment-backed
expectation.
B.

THE ILLEGITIMACY OF THE ILLINOIS SITING STATUTE

The Court's historical tests are important to the attorney who
litigates waste permit denials. This is true because whenever a state
imposes permit conditions, it is inevitably operating pursuant to its
police power. When a state burdens property rights pursuant to its
police power, the conflict between public concerns and private rights
is resolved according to a "legitimacy" review of the statute.28 The
legitimacy review has been further refined by recent Supreme Court
cases which, arguably, favor the property owner or developer.
In 1987, the Supreme Court decided a trilogy of takings cases:
Keystone Bituminous Coal Association v. DeBenedictis, 289 Nollan v.
452 U.S. 264 (1981)).

[Tihe Constitution does not require predeprivation process because it would

be impossible or impracticable to provide a meaningful hearing before

deprivation. Instead, the Constitution is satisfied by the provision of meaningful postdeprivation process. Thus, the State's action is not "complete" in
the sense of causing a constitutional injury "unless or until the state fails to
provide an adequate postdeprivation remedy for the property loss."
Id. at 195 (citing Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 532 n.12
(1984).

286. Id. at 191.
287. See id. at 197.

288. Robert H. Freilich, et al., Reagan's Legacy: A Conservative Majority Rules

on Civil Rights, Civil Liberties and State and Local Government Issues, 21 URB.
633, 723 (1989).
289. 480 U.S. 470 (1987).

LAW.
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California Coastal Commission,2 90 and First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, California.29
Considered together, these cases have the potential to affect state and
local laws regulating waste facility siting because those laws are now
subject to a more stringent legitimacy review. However, because these
decisions raised as many questions as they answered, additional review
of lower court cases interpreting the trilogy is necessary to determine
whether the Illinois siting statute effects a taking.
The first level of the legitimacy review asks whether a regulation
was enacted to promote a legitimate state interest. In Keystone Bituminous Coal Association v. DeBenedictis,292 a five-to-four decision,
the Supreme Court considered whether the revocation of a mining
permit under Pennsylvania's Bituminous Mine Subsidence and Land
Conservation Act constituted a regulatory taking. 293 In the majority
opinion, Justice Stevens carefully distinguished Pennsylvania Coal by
showing that the present Pennsylvania subsidence act was enacted for
a "public purpose ' 294 rather than for private gain and that the
regulation fell within the public nuisance loophole left by Justice
Holmes in Pennsylvania Coal.295 Applying a deferential standard,

Stevens decided the balance in favor of the public interest:

Under our system of government, one of the State's primary
ways of preserving the public weal is restricting the uses
individuals can make of their property. While each of us is
burdened somewhat by such restrictions, we, in turn, benefit
greatly from the restrictions that are placed on others....
Long ago it was recognized that "all property in this country
is held under the implied obligation that the owner's use of it
shall not be injurious to the community," and the Takings
Clause did not transform that principle to one that requires
compensation whenever the State asserts its power to enforce
it.2%

The majority characterization of the Pennsylvania Act as one
which was designed to prevent a nuisance stirred a strong dissent by
four of the justices. Writing for the dissent, Justice Rehnquist argued
290.
291.
292.
293.
294.
295.
296.

483 U.S. 825 (1987).
482 U.S. 304 (1987).
480 U.S. 470 (1987).
Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 474 (1987).
Id. at 485.
Id. at 491.
Id. at 491-92 (citations omitted).
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that the majority expanded application of the nuisance exception
beyond the point allowed by prior precedent. 297 Rehnquist noted that
the nuisance exception to the just compensation clause was only applied
in a narrow way in previous decisions. Additionally, he added that the
exception had never been applied to "allow complete extinction of the
value of a parcel of property." 298 Resolution of the nuisance issue is
central to any action maintained by commercial waste developers
because the court will have a natural tendency to characterize their
operations as a potential nuisance.299

Keystone has been cited most often for its discussion of the weight
to be given to state authority under the police power. Lower courts
have consistently applied the first prong of the test, which requires
that the regulation substantially advance a legitimate state interest,
and held police powers to be very broad.3°° However, courts do not
always reach similar results when applying the test. A comparison of
the analysis in two cases, both of which involve takings claims brought
by poultry processors, highlights the difference in approaches taken
by federal courts.
In Empire Kosher Poultry, Inc. v. Hallowell,30' the Third Circuit
held that the first component of the Keystone decision was controlling
when it held that a poultry quarantine did not constitute a taking of
the plaintiff's property. The government's exercise of its police power
to control the spread of disease carried by the poultry was legitimate.3 °2
In contrast, the Federal Circuit found a USDA quarantine to be a
taking of turkey farmer's property in Yancey v. United States.30 The
most important point made by the Yancey court was that the Keystone
opinion did not stand for the proposition that an exercise of the police
297. Id. at 512 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
298. Id. at 513 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
299. See infra notes 306-08 and accompanying text for a more expansive analysis
of the nuisance exception applied to environmental permitting.
300. See Adolph v. Federal Emergency Mgm't Agency, 854 F.2d 732, 739 n.10
(5th Cir. 1988); Naegele Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. City of Durham, 844 F.2d 172,
175 (4th Cir. 1988); SDJ, Inc. v. City of Houston, 837 F.2d 1268, 1278 (5th Cir.
1988); accord Golden Cheese Co. of Cal. v. Voss, 281 Cal. Rptr. 602, 603 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1991); Gardner v. New Jersey Pinelands Comm'n, 593 A.2d 251, 258 (N.J.
1991); Birnbaum v. State, 541 N.E.2d 23, 27 (N.Y. 1989); Jones v. Zoning Hearing
Bd., 578 A.2d 1369, 1370 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1990).
301. 816 F.2d 907 (3d Cir. 1987).
302. Empire Kosher Poultry, Inc. v. Hallowell, 816 F.2d 907, 915 (3d Cir. 1987).
303. 915 F.2d 1534 (Fed. Cir. 1990). This court decided that the burden of a
quarantine benefiting the public should be carried by the public. Yancey v. United
States, 915 F.2d 1534, 1542 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
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power "conclusively forecloses all claims for just compensation.,04
Although both Empire Kosher and Yancey dealt with facts which

arguably established the existence of a nuisance, in Yancey, the Federal
Circuit Court recognized that the existence of a nuisance does not end
the inquiry of whether a taking has occurred.3 5 The opposite conclusions may be explained by the Federal Circuit's expertise in regulatory
takings claims and the frequency with which those claims are reviewed.
The Federal Circuit is more likely to engage in balancing private and
public interests even where a possible nuisance is involved. 3°0
Using the balancing of rights approach, the Federal Circuit and
the United States Claims Court have held in favor of developers of
wetlands in two significant cases: Florida Rock Industries, Inc. v.
United States3°7 and Loveladies Harbor,Inc. v. United States.3°8 These
304. Id. at 1540.
305. Id.
When adverse economic impact and unanticipated deprivation of an investment backed interest are suffered, as when the poultry quarantine forced the
Yanceys to sell their turkey flock, compensation under the Fifth Amendment
is appropriate. Even when pursuing the public good, as the USDA was doing
when it imposed the poultry quarantine, the Government does not operate
in a vacuum ....

Why should the Yanceys be forced to bear their own losses

when their turkeys were not diseased?

Id. at 1542.

306. See, e.k., Ciampitti v. United States, 18 Cl. Ct. 548, 557 n.14 (1989)
(recognizing that defendants had a colorable claim for compensation although their
activity could be described as an environmental hazard). But see Atlas Corp. v. United
States, 895 F.2d 745 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (finding that a regulation requiring plaintiff to
decommission uranium mill and dispose of tailings was an appropriate police power
act enacted to preserve public welfare); Allied-General Nuclear Servs. v. United States,
839 F.2d 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (arguing that Keystone revitalized the nuisance exception
and that a moratorium on plutonium production and recycling was a valid exercise of
police power).
307. 791 F.2d 893 (Fed. Cir. 1986). The federal circuit recognized the possibility
that a taking had occurred and remanded to the lower court with the following
instruction:
[T]he court should consider, along with other relevant matters, the relationship of the owner's basis or investment, and the fair market value before the
alleged taking, to the fair market value after the alleged taking. In determining
the severity of economic impact, the owner's opportunity to recoup its
investment or better, subject to the regulation, cannot be ignored.
Id. at 905. On remand, the United States Claims Court held that the plaintiff had
established a legitimate property entitlement. Florida Rock Indus., Inc. v. United
States, 21 Cl. Ct. 161, 167 (1990). The court further held that plaintiff had been
denied all economically viable use of the property and granted plaintiff $1,029,000.00
in damages for the taking. Id. at 176.
308. 15 Cl. Ct. 381 (1988). The court stated that "[u]nder the undisputed facts
given, it is hard to imagine a takings claim more deserving of compensation. Plaintiff's
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cases are important to the present inquiry because each involved
developmental permit denials and each arguably denied that the nuisance exception allows the government to exercise police powers for
which compensation is never owed.? 9
Given the divergent rulings by state and federal courts on the
nuisance exception, it is clear that Keystone left many takings questions
unanswered. Courts continue to grapple with the issue of whether an
activity constitutes a nuisance and may be regulated or whether the
harmful activity is only one factor in the equation. Because the
Keystone Court warned against allowing the nuisance exception to
swallow the rule, lower courts should accept arguments from practitioners litigating siting difficulties regarding the balancing of their
clients' property rights. 10 While some may argue that Keystone has
invited more stringent regulation of the environment, "[t]he simple
invocation of an environmental stake is not sufficient to justify
government action under the police power ...."I" Moreover, the
pervasive nature of federal and state environmental regulation renders
activities within the scope of those regulations outside the nuisance
exception. 1 2

In Lucas v. South CarolinaCoastal Council,313 the Supreme Court

has recently breathed new life into the role of nuisance analysis in
takings cases. In the lower court, Lucas conceded that South Carolina
could regulate his beachfront property pursuant to its police power,
land has suffered a severe economic impact. The permit denial has reduced the
property's current value to, at most, only two percent of what it was previously." Id.
at 396. However, due to the procedural posture of the case, on cross-motions for
summary judgment, the court remanded for a determination of the property value
remaining after the permit denial. Id. at 399.
309. In a recent commentary, an attorney involved in Florida Rock analyzed
whether these cases suggest a trend in the courts to afford private property owners
more protection from stringent governmental regulation. The author notes that the
Government intends to appeal the cases and that one or more may find its way to the
Supreme Court for review. John A. DeVault III, Regulatory Takings: Can the
Government Be Liable?, NAT. RESOURCES & ENv'T, Summer 1991, at 10, 54.

310. Cf. Michelman, supra note 274, at 1603 (discussing Keystone opinion).
311. EPsTmN, supra note 276, at 121.
312. Yankee Atomic Elec. Co. v. Secretary of Commonwealth, 526 N.E.2d 1246,
1254 (Mass. 1988) (Lynch, J., dissenting) (arguing that petition to close Yankee nuclear
plant constitutes a taking of all use of the property). Justice Lynch concluded: "Force
of logic compels the conclusion that nuclear power, which is both permitted and
extensively regulated by the government, cannot constitute a public nuisance." Id.
While there is a dearth of cases citing to the trilogy cases brought by waste developers,

the state of the law certainly suggests that a permit denial or other adverse regulatory
measure may give rise to a compensable taking.
313. 112 S.Ct. 2886 (1992).
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but maintained that just compensation was due because he had been
denied all use of his property. 1 4 The Supreme Court of South Carolina
held in favor of the Coastal Council when it declared that where a
statute is designed to prevent a "serious public harm," the state owes
no compensation even where all value in the property is destroyed. 3"
Although Justice Scalia recognized the line of cases supporting
regulation of harmful uses without the necessity of compensation,
Scalia took issue with South Carolina's characterization of the Beachfront Management Act as preventing a nuisance. He noted the difficulty in distinguishing between an act which is designed to prevent a
harm and one which confers a benefit to the public, stating the
distinction "is often in the eye of the beholder.131 6 In placing total
regulatory takings on the same plane as physical invasion of property,
the Court gave crucial guidance to state courts who will undoubtedly
face this issue repeatedly in the months to come:
Any limitation so severe cannot be newly legislated or decreed
(without compensation), but must inhere in the title itself, in
the restrictions that background principles of the State's law
of property and nuisance already place upon land ownership.
A law or decree with such an effect must, in other words, do
314. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 404 S.E.2d 895, 896 (S.C. 1991),
rev'd, 112 S.Ct. 2886 (1992). Lucas purchased property on a barrier island off the
coast of Charleston with the intent to build residences. At the time he purchased the
property, Lucas was not required by South Carolina's coastal management legislation
to seek a permit from the Coastal Council. Lucas, 112 S.Ct. at 2889. However, in
1988, the passage of the Beachfront Management Act changed the boundaries approved
for development and affected the property owned by Lucas dramatically - no
development whatsoever was permitted. Id.
315. Lucas, 404 S.E.2d at 899, rev'd, 112 S.Ct. 2886 (1992).
316. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2877 (1992). The
Court explained that .'[hjarmful or noxious use' analysis was ... simply the

progenitor of our more contemporary statements that 'land-use regulation does not
effect a taking if it substantially advance[s] legitimate state interests'

. . .

." Id.

(citations omitted). The Court further explained its desire to move away from the
"harm preventing/benefit conferring" distinction:
[I]t
becomes self-evident that noxious-use logic cannot serve as a touchstone
to distinguish regulatory "takings" - which require compensation - from
regulatory deprivations that do not require compensation. A fortiori the
legislature's recitation of a noxious-use justification cannot be the basis for
departing from our categorical rule that total regulatory takings must be
compensated. If it were, departure would virtually always be allowed. The
South Carolina Supreme Court's approach would essentially nullify Mahon's
affirmation of limits to the noncompensable exercise of the police power.
Id. at 2899.
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no more than duplicate the result that could have been achieved

in the courts - by adjacent landowners (or other uniquely
affected persons) - under the State's law of private nuisances,
or by the State under its complementary power to abate
17
nuisances that affect the public generally, or otherwise.'
The opinion does, at long last, clarify the Court's position on the
proper analysis of the first prong of the legitmacy inquiry - states'
ability to exercise police power without incurring an obligation to
compensate affected landowners. However, a new level of uncertainty
has been injected as governmental entities and landowners must now

ascertain how new land uses fit into the mold created by common-law
principles of state nuisance law. No land-use laws will be more affected

than those which purport to regulate the environment. The Lucas
decision promises to renew the debate over how the nuisance exception

is to be applied to environmental laws.31 The Court's reversal of the
South Carolina Supreme Court should strengthen the chance that the
Illinois siting statute will be deemed a regulatory taking for which

compensation is due even though is purports to regulate a nuisance
pursuant to state police powers.

The second level of the legitimacy review asks whether the regu-

lation substantially advances the asserted legitimate state interest. The
317. Id. at 2900. The Court concludes its opinion by providing a list of factors
to be included in state court application of nuisance law as applied to takings claims:
(1) degree of harm to public and private property or resources, (2) the social value of
the landowner's proposed activities, (3) the suitability of those activities to the location,
(4) the ease or difficulty by which the landowner and the government can minimize
the asserted harm of the proposed activities, (5) consideration of implied lack of any
common-law prohibition as evidenced by similar uses by similarly situated landowners,
and (6) failure by the State to prevent similarly situated landowners from engaging in
similar activities. Id. at 2991.
Under this analysis, the Court considered it highly unlikely that South Carolina
nuisance law would prohibit Lucas from improving his land as "common-law principles
...rarely support prohibition of the "essential use" of land." Id. Nevertheless, the
Court remanded the case to the South Carolina Supreme Court allowing an opportunity
for it to apply common-law principles of nuisance to the facts. Id.
318. See David Kaplan & Bob Cohn, Pay Me or Get Off My Land, NEWSWEEK,
Mar. 9, 1992, at 70. Discussing the nuisance exception, the article notes the potential
affect that a ruling favoring the plaintiff would have on environmental laws. "[W]hat
the justices do is paramount: a decision may effectively gut a generation of land
regulation ....
A victory for Lucas would signal 'open season o environmental
laws' . . ." Id. This prediction was perhaps accurate as the court did conspicuously

include examples of takings cases which involved state attempts to preserve wetlands.
Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2897. In the future, all environmental regulation may be suspect,
or at a minimum, may be reviewed with a heightend level of scrutiny under state
nuisance law.
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leading case is Nollan v. California Coastal Commission.31 9 The Nollans owned property adjoining a public beach. They desired to destroy
20
the existing improvement and replace it with a three-bedroom home.
They applied for and were granted a permit from the California
Coastal Commission "subject to the condition that they allow the
public an easement to pass across a portion of their property bounded
by the mean high tide line on one side, and their seawall on the other
side." '3 21 The Commission believed the easement was necessary to
preserve public access to the beach.3 22 Because the condition invaded
the Nollans' right to exclude others from their property, the Court
had little trouble establishing a physical taking .123
Justice Scalia recognized that a condition which substantially
advanced a legitimate purpose and which did not substantially interfere
with property rights might pass constitutional muster. However, Justice
Scalia heightened the scrutiny to be applied to the "nexus" of the
legitimate state interest and the regulation which achieves the interest. 24
If a state land-use regulation lacks the essential nexus between means
and ends, and if the conditions of the regulation do not serve the
exact state interest, the regulation may not be constitutional. Thus,
authorities responsible for the granting of use permits will, in the
future, be required to insure that "a close fit exists between the
regulation and the condition sought to be alleviated by it. "325
Strictly interpreted, Nollan is only instructive for cases involving
a physical invasion of property, a scenario unlikely to occur in the
context of a commercial siting of a waste facility. However, the
decision may be more beneficial if it is considered for its value in
supplying a heightened standard of review for takings cases. Most of
319. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
320. Id. at 827-28.
321. Id. at 828.
322. Id. at 828-29.
323. Id. at 837.
324. Id.
[Tlhe lack of nexus between the condition and the original purpose of the
building restriction converts that purpose to something other than what it
was. The purpose then becomes, quite simply, the obtaining of an easement
to serve some valid governmental purpose, but without payment of compensation ....

In short, unless the permit condition serves the same govern-

mental purpose as the development ban, the building restriction is not a valid
regulation of land use but an "out-and-out plan of extortion."
Id. (citations omitted).
325. Linda J. Bozung & M. Randall McRoberts, Land Use, Planning and Zoning
in 1987: A National Survey, 19 URB. LAW. 899, 905 (1987).
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the debate among commentators has focused upon the standard of
review because of its heightened potential to favor property owners
over governmental entities .126
Since the decision, most lower courts have declined to use the
heightened scrutiny approach.3 27 In fact, many relegate discussion of
the case to footnote status.3 2 However, if the lower courts do begin
to take the decision seriously, the reach of the decision may be greater.
For example, local ordinances requiring certain permit conditions for
approval may have to exhibit the close fit between health and safety
goals and the condition designed to promote those goals. It may serve
to dispel the sometimes arbitrary conditions imposed by local governments during a permitting process.3 29 The decision may also have
significance for waste facility developers who are often faced with
demands from a municipality for exactions in return for permit
approval.3 3 0
Recognition of the Nollan standard of review in regulatory takings
cases by the lower courts is critical to the present inquiry because this
author maintains that the current Illinois siting scheme imposes conditions on permitting of waste facilities which may not meet the
326. Compare Michelman, supra note 274, at 1601, 1608 (contending that there
may be "less than meets the eye" in the recent decisions and stating that a narrow
reading of Nollan is most appropriate because of its focus on the physical aspect of

the taking) and Steven J. Lemon et al., Comment, The First Applications of the
Nollan Nexus Test: Observations and Comments, 13 HAR. ENVTL. L. REv. 585, 590

(1989) (explaining that the courts may continue to balance without actually applying
a heightened scrutiny standard) with MANDELKER I, supra note 260, §1.16, at 15
(Supp. 1991) (urging that Nollan has delivered a new era. He notes that the change
may be dramatic as the Court applies heightened scrutiny and could reverse the
presumption of constitutionality of many land-use regulations) and Peterson, supra
note 275, at 99-100 (stating that the Court has demonstrated a willingness to examine
the true legislative purpose).
327. A recent student comment reviewed the prominent articles, which appeared
in the 1988 issue of the Columbia Law Review, on the Nollan decision and recent
takings decisions to illuminate the confusion created by the "nexus'.' approach applied
in the decision. The authors conclude with two points about the decision's effect on
environmental regulators. First, the heightened scrutiny approach may result in a
"considerable decline in regulatory activities" to the detriment of the environment.
Second, the resulting confusion in the lower courts over the meaning of Nollan may
leave some planners uncertain about the scope of their authority to regulate. See
Steven J. Lemon et al., supra note 326, at 602.
328. See, e.g., Estate of Himelstein v. City of Fort Wayne, 898 F.2d 573, 576
n.3 (7th Cir. 1990).
329. E.g., Geo-Tech Reclamation Indus., Inc. v. Hamrick, 886
F.2d 662, 666 (4th Cir. 1989).
330. See generally Kayden, supra note 92.
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"substantial nexus" test."' Scholarly debate engendered by the Nollan

decision contemplated whether the scope of judicial review ,in
takings
cases would indeed become more intensive or applied in a heightened
fashion.332 After nearly five years, it remains unclear whether lower
federal and state courts view the decision as a revision of the previous

rational basis standard. The courts are split on the issue.33

While most of the federal circuits have cited the decision, the

critical inquiry is whether the circuit actually recognized and applied
the substantial nexus test. One circuit court concluded that "Nollan
did not revolutionize takings law. 334 A similar assumption was made
in other federal cases. 35 However, other federal courts have recognized
that Nollan requires a more stringent analysis of the fit between the
ends and means of any given regulation over private property.33 6
331. See supra notes 89-95 and accompanying text.

332. See supra notes 326-27 and accompanying text.
333. Based upon author's comprehensive review of cases citing Nollan through
March 1992. See also infra notes 334-39 and accompanying text.

334. Adolph v. Federal Emergency Management Agency, 854 F.2d 732, 737 (5th
Cir. 1988) (citing numerous articles which interpreted Nollan).
335. See Samaad v. City of Dallas, 940 F.2d 925, 939 (5th Cir. 1991) (distinguishing Nollan on the basis of lack of physical invasion in the instant case and deciding
on other grounds that the regulation governed a nuisance); Conti v. City of Fremont,
919 F.2d 1385, 1389 (9th Cir. 1990) (applying only a rational basis standard to age
restrictions contained in conditional permit); Lakeview Dev. Corp. v. City of South
Lake Tahoe, 915 F.2d 1290, 1294 (9th Cir. 1990) (distinguishing the instant permitting
requirement as one which was a legitimate land use regulation); Naegele Outdoor
Advertising, Inc. v. City of Durham, 844 F.2d 172, 178 (4th Cir. 1988) (holding that
prohibition of billboards is related to city's interest but failing to support either the
legitimacy of the interest in aesthetics or to discuss the substantial relationship); AlliedGeneral Nuclear Servs. v. United States, 839 F.2d 1572, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1988) ("[Tlhe
prevailing opinion in Nollan concedes that use for purposes within the object of the
power reserved will be valid even if detrimental to the owner's full utilization of the
property.").
336. See McDougal v. County of Imperial, 942 F.2d 668 (9th Cir. 1991) ("To
hold that a legitimate public interest alone precludes a taking without regard to the
degree of private deprivation turns the Court's balancing of interests into a brightline test for which there is no precedent") Id. at 677; Lockary v. Kayfetz, 917 F.2d
1150, 1155 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that Nollan requires more than a showing of
rational relation between water moratorium and state concern over a water shortage
- it requires that the state prove the existence of a water shortage to support invasion
of property rights); Consolidated Gas Co. of Fla. v. City Gas Co., 912 F.2d 1262
(1 th Cir. 1990); Pinewood Estates v. Barnegat Township, 898 F.2d 347, 351 (3d Cir.
1990) (holding that allowing tenants to remain in mobile homes without paying rent
stripped landlords of valuable possessory property right); Richardson v. Honolulu,
759 F. Supp. 1477, 1496 (D. Haw. 1991) (extensive discussion of the Nollan approach
and concluding that the particular rent control ordinance does not reduce costs while
providing a reasonable return for landlords).
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State courts have split along lines similar to the federal circuit

courts. In some cases, state courts have fully recognized and applied
a heightened standard of review.337 In other state cases, courts have
recognized that Nollan may apply but have not found that heightened

review results in a finding that plaintiffs' property has been taken by

regulation.33 SNollan has been applied by one Illinois appellate court to
invalidate a permit condition requiring the owner to agree that improvements made would not increase the value of the right of access
to the property.33 9

Arguably, the Supreme Court has now sent the message that it
will apply a heightened standard of legitimacy review to regulatory
takings cases. In Yee v. City of Escondido, California,3° the Court
considered whether a state statute in combination with a local rent
control ordinance constituted a per se taking of mobile park owners'
property because the laws had the effect of transferring ownership
rights to tenants.3 4' Although the Court decided the single issue,
whether the rent control ordinance was a physical taking by the city,
against the plaintiff, 342 the majority opinion does suggest that the same
facts may give rise to a regulatory taking.Y3 Noting that the ordinance

337. See Giffin Homes v. Superior Court, 280 Cal. Rptr. 792, 798 (Cal. Ct. App.
1991) (invalidating exaction required by building permit as bearing no relation to the
benefit exacted); State v. Putman, 552 A.2d 1247, 1253 (Del. Super. Ct. 1988) (holding
that police power does not include right to impose a servitude on private land for a
public purpose); Electro-Tech, Inc. v. H.F. Campbell Co., 445 N.W.2d 61, 67 (Mich.
1989) (holding that Nollan was dispositive of the case because the condition imposed
was not related to building permit).
338. See Long Beach Equities v. County of Ventura, 282 Cal. Rptr. 877, 884
(Cal. Ct. App. 1991); Parranto Bros. v. City of New Brighton, 425 N.W.2d 585, 59091 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988); McElwain v. County of Flathead, 811 P.2d 1267, 1270
(Mont. 1991); Gardner v. New Jersey Pinelands Comm'n, 593 A.2d 251, 259 (N.J.
1991); River Birch Assoc. v. City of Raleigh, 388 S.E.2d 538, 550-51 (N.C. 1990);
State v. City of Columbus, 564 N.E.2d 1081, 1086-87 (Ohio Ct. App. 1988) (recognizing Nollan but finding it inapplicable to the case because Nollan involved interference with complete control of property); Schoonover v. Klamath County, 806 P.2d
156, 158 (Or. Ct. App. 1991).
339. Department of Transp. v. Amoco Oil Co., 528 N.E.2d 1018, 1024 (Ill.
Ct.
App. 1988) (extensively considering Nollan and holding that purpose was not served
by conditioning access permit on agreement to depress property values).
340. 112 S. Ct. 1522 (1992).
341. Id.at 1527.
342. Id.at 1531.
343. Id.at 1529.
Petitioners are correct in citing the existence of this premium [increased value
of tenants' mobile homes] as a difference between the alleged effect of the

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 12

was a regulation and not a per se taking, the Court analyzed whether
the regulatory taking claim was in the correct procedural posture to
be addressed by the Court. 344 The Court stated that the regulatory
taking claim was important, but the Court believed that its Rule
14.1(a) prevented consideration of that issue. 45 The extensive discussion of regulatory takings analysis, an issue not technically before the
Court, in the majority opinion suggests that the decision could be
considered instructive for purposes of clarifying the Court's position
on the standard of legitimacy review. 346
C.

ADVERSE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF A SITING DENIAL

The final inquiry in the regulatory takings doctrine is the extent
of the economic impact. Recall that the tests for determining whether
a regulation effects a taking based upon economic impact appear in
several different Court opinions.3 47 Relevant to the present discussion
is the Keystone Court's analysis of the method property owners must
Escondido ordinance and that of an ordinary apartment rent control statute.... By contrast, petitioners contend that the Escondido ordinance
transfers wealth only to the incumbent mobile home owner. This effect might
have some bearing on whether the ordinance causes a regulatory taking, as
it may shed some light on whether there is a sufficient nexus between the
effect of the ordinance and the objectives it is supposed to advance.
Id. at 1530 (citing Nollan).
344. Id. at 1532.
345. Id. at 1523 (holding that the issues were related but that the regulatory
taking claim was not "fairly included therein," within the physical occupation claim).
346. Seven justices joined all aspects of the majority opinion. Justices Blackmun
and Souter concurred but wrote separately to criticize the majority's focus on the
regulatory takings claim raised by the facts. They found the regulatory takings issue
less important or not relevant. Id. at 1534-35. Thus, this author maintains that Yee
can be useful to the practitioner who pursues a regulatory takings claim because at
least seven justices have implied that they would apply a heightened legitimacy review
to land-use regulations based upon the Nollan decision.
As predicted, the Court has sent a clear message that Nollan requires application
of a heightened level of scrutiny to state land-use regulations in its recent Lucas
decision.
We emphasize that to win its case, South Carolina must do more than proffer
the legislature's declaration that the uses Lucas desires are inconsistent with
the public interest, or the conclusory assertion that they violate a commonlaw maxim such as sic utere tuo ut alienum non iaedas. ... South Carolina
must identify background principles of nuisance and property law that
prohibit the uses he now intends in the circumstances in which the property
is presently found.
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2901-02 (1992).
347. See supra notes 279-83 and accompanying text.
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use to demonstrate that a regulation has so burdened a property
interest that a taking has occurred. In Keystone, the plaintiff alleged
that the Pennsylvania act deprived it of a distinct property interest
recognized under state law - the support estate. The posture of the
case as merely a facial challenge posed a real difficulty for the plaintiff
because the facts had not been developed to show an economic impact
or interference with investment-backed expectations.m Moreover, the
Court rejected the landowner's attempt to show that it had lost all
value in its separate support estate, as a recognized property interest
in Pennsylvania, by holding that the appropriate inquiry is based on
the economic loss to the property as a whole unit.3' 9
The Court's consideration of units of property undermines what
seemed like a favorable test for property owners in Penn Central.3
The petitioners contended that the relevant property unit was the entire
support estate while the Court characterized the support estate as a
small strand in the bundle of property rights. 31 Thus, in future cases
it will be incumbent upon property owners to show that all economically viable uses of their property have been denied. This burden will
352
be difficult to meet.

348. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBendictis, 480 U.S. 470, 495 (1987)
(citing the "denies an owner economically viable use of his land" test in Agins v.
Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980) and "interference with reasonable investment
backed expectations" test in Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 175 (1979)).
349. Id. at 496-501.
350. By emphasizing the property owner's investment in his property, the
Court favors the property owner's rather than government interests. This tilt
is especially important because the Court, since a landmark 1922 case, has
seldom held a regulation of property to be a taking. Because this tilt in the
expectations taking factor is favorable to property owners, it may increase
the number of cases in which courts find a taking. For example, the mere
purchase of land, with an expectation that it will be developed for a use
disallowed by a land use regulation, could create an investment-backed
expectation protected by the taking clause.
Mandelker II, supra note 278, at 6 (footnotes omitted).
351. Keystone, 480 U.S. at 496-97. "When the coal that must remain beneath
the ground is viewed in the context of any reasonable unit of petitioners' coal mining
operations and financial-backed expectations, it is plain that petitioners have not come
close to satisfying their burden of proving that they have been denied the economically
viable use of that property." Id. at 499.
352. After Keystone, commercial waste site developers will be required to provide
evidence that the site chosen has no other economically viable uses. This standard
may prove less difficult for those developers who are seeking a renewal of their
operating permits because the prior use may render the land in question unsuitable
for other uses. Thus, there is a stronger case for Illinois waste management companies

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 12

Under Keystone, waste developers and processors may find it

difficult to overcome a court's deference to the local government's
asserted purpose in protecting public health and the environment in

order to assert that a taking has occurred by the denial of a development permit. However, the decision is instructive regarding the evi-

dence necessary to prove economic impact on the property as a whole
or frustration of investment-backed expectations.353
Not only must waste disposal developers overcome the nuisance
exception when litigating takings claims from permit denials, they must
also be prepared to demonstrate that the alleged taking has frustrated
a distinct investment-backed expectation. 5 4 This second prong of the
Keystone test has been used extensively by lower courts to deny

plaintiffs' claims. 3" If an owner retains any economically viable use

of the property, the federal courts have been reluctant to find a Fifth

Amendment taking. 56 Similarly, this argument has prevailed in the
state courts following Keystone.35 7 Illinois courts also apply the strinwho seek expansions or modifications of their permit under this prong because there
will probably be a government restriction on future use for the property or there will

be no market.

353. See supra notes 127-35 and accompanying text for an example of how a
distinct investment-backed expectation might be frustrated by environmental regulation.
354. See supra note 349.
355. See infra notes 356-58.
356. See Esposito v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 939 F.2d 165, 170 (4th Cir.
1991) (finding that plaintiffs' lack of change in existing use after enactment of
beachfront protection measures was evidence that the statute had not gone too far in
regulating their property); Gilbert v. City of Cambridge, 932 F.2d 51, 56-57 (1st Cir.
1991) (holding that landlord retained economically useful property under rent control
ordinance because the ordinance facially assured landlords "entitlement to receive a
'fair net operating income'); Naegele Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. City of Durham,
844 F.2d 172, 178 (4th Cir. 1988) (remanded for determination of comparative unit
of business affected by anti-billboard ordinance and noting that this factual inquiry is
complex but necessary under current Supreme Court tests); Lake Nacimiento Ranch
v. San Luis Obispo County, 830 F.2d 977, 981-82 (9th Cir. 1987) (noting that property
owner has the burden of proof on the denial of economic viability for all permissible
uses of property); see also Ciampitti v. United States, 22 Cl. Ct. 310, 318-21 (1991)
(listing several factors considered to answer whether all use had been denied and
holding the reasonableness of investment given advance knowledge of regulation is
central to court's inquiry). But see Florida Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 21 Cl.
Ct. 161, 170 (1990) (utilizing comparison of value before government action and value
after the action, but not requiring plaintiff to prove the negative proposition of
absence of any value in the property).
357. See Hornstein v. Barry, 560 A.2d 530, 537 (D.C. 1988) (holding that rent
control laws did not deprive owner of all economically viable uses and establishing
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gent "deny all economically-viable use" test. 58
Keystone's progeny are instructive for practitioners who must
fight waste development permit denials in Illinois. The cases show that
courts are reluctant to find a taking, even under facts favorable to
developers. They illustrate the various factors courts use to determine
both whether distinct investment-backed expectations of developers are
reasonable and whether owners have been denied all use of their
property. However, they also indicate that the law is evolving and that
a developer may prevail on a takings claim if the factual foundation
is strong. Moreover, practitioners should note that the Supreme Court
has not reviewed the factors being used in the lower courts and has
instead relied upon an ad hoc formula. 5 9 Strong arguments continue
to be made that the economic viability and investment-backed expec6
tations tests are being misapplied by some lower courts. w

that a reasonable return on investment remained possible under the Penn Central test);
Easter Lake Estates, Inc. v. Polk County, 444 N.W.2d 72, 76 (Iowa 1989) (focusing
on owner's unreasonable expectation regarding investment in mobile park located in
floodplain area); Bond v. Department of Natural Resources, 454 N.W.2d 395, 398
(Mich. Ct. App. 1990) (reversing lower court ruling that wetlands restriction constituted
a taking on the ground that plaintiff could apply for other developmental permits
allowed under the statute); McElwain v. County of Flathead, 811 P.2d 1267, 1271-72
(Mont. 1991) (affirming lower court ruling that mere diminution of value is insufficient
to establish a taking); Burlington Assem. of God v. Zoning Bd., 588 A.2d 1297, 1302
(N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1990) (denial of variance to erect radio station did not
deprive plaintiff of all uses of the property and the county was not liable for incidental
expenses incurred in seeking the variance); State v. Lundberg, 788 P.2d 456, 458 (Or.
Ct. App. 1990) (holding that plaintiff had not demonstrated that the required sidewalk
dedication deprived plaintiff of ability to develop the property); Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Council, 404 S.E.2d 895, 901 (S.C. 1991) (rejecting plaintiff's
argument fashioned after the Rehnquist dissent in Keystone), rev'd, 112 S. Ct. 2886
(1992); Estate of Scott v. Victoria County, 778 S.W.2d 585, 591-92 (Tex. Ct. App.
1989) (holding that plaintiff's residential development was unreasonable given knowledge of sewer moratorium and that mere decrease in profitability is insufficient to
establish constitutional taking).
358. St. Lucas Ass'n v. City of Chicago, 571 N.E.2d 865, 875-76 (IIn. App. Ct.
1991) (holding that zoning change denial did not go "too far" because a long list of
potential uses was available to landowner); Old Ben Coal v. Department of Mines,
562 N.E.2d 1202, 1209 (I11.App. Ct. 1991) (reviewing facts similar to those in Keystone
and holding that plaintiff had failed to demonstrate that subsidence regulation
prevented all economic uses).
359. Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211, 224 (1986) ("we
have eschewed the development of any set formula for identifying a "taking"
forbidden by the 5th Amendment . .

").

360. See, e.g., Esposito v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 939 F.2d 165, 17174 (4th Cir. 1991) (Hall, J., dissenting).
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It remains to be seen how the Court will view the nuisance

exception and the investment-backed expectation factor in future cases-

because change in the composition of the Court may again tilt the
analysis in favor of property owners. The Yee Court cited Penn Central
for the proposition that regulatory takings analysis "necessarily entails
complex factual assessments of the purposes and economic effects of
government action."'1 The emphasis on Penn Central indicates that
the Court will continue to balance governmental purpose of the
burden on property
regulation against the proportionate economic
62
regulation.
the
by
out
owners who are singled
In the third case of the trilogy, First English EvangelicalLutheran
3 63
Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, the Supreme Court
distinquished a long line of takings decisions to reach the question of
64 Without
whether a temporary regulatory taking was compensable.
Legislators and administrators undoubtedly often face the choice between
purchasing a property right or regulating it away. In these days of deficits,
it must be tempting to choose the costless regulatory route. Perhaps the
Framers would have ensured more efficient government by permitting thievery
of private property for public uses. However, they sacrificed the expedience
of this approach in favor of a system that requires a proposed public use be
one for which the public is willing to foot the bill....
South Carolina now admits that its longstanding land use policies were
ill-advised. Good government occasionally requires such admissions; history
is a lesson, not a straightjacket. However, a governmental error is a collective
error, and the burden of rectifying it should be borne by all, not just by
those who unfortunately, but reasonably, relied on it.
Id. at 173-74.
The Supreme Court recently acknowledged the inconsistent results engendered by
the Penn Central, Keystone and Mahon opinions. In Lucas, the Court did not find it
necessary to apply the "'deprivation of all economically feasible use' rule" because
the loss of the estate in property alleged by Lucas is clearly proteted. Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2894 n.7 (1992). The Court noted that
"[tihe answer to this difficult question may lie in how the owner's reasonable
expectations have been shaped by the State's law of property .... ." Id. Moreover,
the Court presumably rejected the formula advanced in Penn Central as "unsupportable" so that landowners will not now have to bear the strenous burden of proving
loss of value in comparison to the entire worth of the property. Rather, it appears as
though the proper consideration will be loss of a particular subestate in property as
shaped by reasonable expectations of gain in that estate. Id.
361. Yee v. City of Escondido, 112 S.Ct. 1522, 1526 (1992).
362. Id. at 1529. Arguably, because the regulatory takings issue was not properly
before the Court, much of what was written about regulatory takings could be
considered dicta. However, Yee offers practitioners a preview of the Court's focus
for the next regulatory takings case.
363. 482 U.S. 304 (1987).
364. First English Evang. Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles,
482 U.S. 304, 305-08 (1987).
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deciding whether a taking had occurred,365 the Court affirmed the
hypothetical right of property owners to be compensated under the
Fifth Amendment. The remedy limitations in Agins v. City of Tiburon6
were overruled in favor of monetary compensation for plaintiffs. That

a compensatory remedy was also allowed for a temporary taking was

made clear in the following statement by the Court: "[WIhere the
government's activities have already worked a taking of all use of the
property, no subsequent action by the government can relieve it of the

duty to provide compensation for the period during which the taking
was effective."3 67
Although property owners denied use of their property, even on

a temporary basis, can now rest assured that a monetary remedy will
follow, they cannot be certain whether a regulatory taking has in fact

occurred.368 If local officials fear that environmental regulations may
result in a mandatory payment of damages, two outcomes are possible.
First, local lawmakers may weaken regulations to the point of detriment to public health. Waste facility developers may easily coerce local
officials to disregard necessary regulations which impede the siting of

a facility. Second, the decision may force local officials to carefully
tailor their regulations to balance the public interest in preserving
health and safety with the individual interest in owning private property
free from burdensome government regulation.
365. The peculiar procedural posture of First English allowed the Supreme
Court to review this case without a prior state determination that the church's
property had in fact been taken, which was precisely the issue that had
prevented the Court from deciding the remedy question in previous decisions.
Since the California Court of Appeals construed the church's complaint as
stating a claim in inverse condemnation for a regulatory taking, previously
rejected by the California Supreme Court in Agins v. Tiburon, it prevented
the church from proceeding with its federal claims under the fifth amendment
property clause, thus providing the United States Supreme Court with the
requisite finality.
Bozung & McRoberts, supra note 325, at 902 (footnotes omitted). The case was
remanded for determination of whether a taking had, in fact, occurred. The California
Court of Appeals held that no taking of the Church's property had occurred. See
First English Evang. Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 258
Cal. Rptr. 893 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989).
366. 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
367. First English, 482 U.S. at 321.
368. In a thorough review of First English, Susan Looper-Friedman points out
that lower courts will still have to grapple with what facts will engender a regulatory
taking. She examines the history of the criteria necessary to prove a taking, criticizes
the interpretation placed on the remedy, and concludes that the decision must have
''created a property interest in the constitutional right to substantive due process."
See Looper-Friedman, supra note 265, at 34-39 (1990).
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In the dissenting opinion of First English, Justice Stevens made
the following prediction:
The policy implications of today's decision are obvious
and, I fear, far reaching. Cautious local officials and land use
planners may avoid taking any action that might later be
challenged and thus give rise to a damages action. Much
important regulation will never be enacted, even perhaps in the
health and safety area. Were this result mandated by the
Constitution, these serious implications would have to be ignored. But the loose cannon the Court fires today is not only
unattached to the Constitution, but it also takes aim at a long
line of precedents in the regulatory takings area. It would be
the better part of valor simply to decide the case at hand
instead of igniting the kind of litigation explosion that this
decision will undoubtedly touch off.3 69
The takings trilogy has engendered a "litigation explosion" in the
federal and state courts. In four brief years, the trilogy decisions have
been cited hundreds of times in the lower courts.170 The initial wave
of decisions following the Court's pronouncements in the trilogy cases
involved an effort on the part of litigants to have courts rehear their
claims in light of those decisions. Most of those efforts were to no
avail. " ' When courts did consider the holdings in the trilogy cases,
they often held that the cases had no effect on their takings analysis
72
so that they felt free to continue to balance the parties' rights. Just
as the Supreme Court often does not reach the merits of a takings
case because of procedural prematurity, the Federal Circuit Courts of
369. First English, 482 U.S. at 340-41 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
370. Statement supported by this author's review of cases citing the Supreme
Court's trilogy of takings cases.
371. See, e.g., Fusco v. Connecticut, 815 F.2d 201, 206 (2d Cir. 1987); accord
Atlanta Bd. of Zoning Adjustment v. Midtown North, 360 S.E.2d 569, 570 n.2 (Ga.
1987); Merritt v. State, 742 P.2d 397, 405 (Idaho 1986); Smith v. City of Owatonna,
450 N.W.2d 309'(Minn. 1990); New Jersey Builders Ass'n v. Fenske, 591 A.2d 1362,
1370 (N.J. Super. 1991).
372. See McDougal v. County of Imperial, 942 F.2d 668, 676 (9th Cir. 1991)
("We read the Supreme Court as requiring us to balance the strength of the public
interest against the severity of the private deprivation."); Samaad v. City of Dallas,
940 F.2d 925, 938 (5th Cir. 1991) (exclaiming that the factor test does not exist and
that the recent opinions have not "automatically invoked" the three-part test);
Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 15 Cl. Ct. 381, 388 (1988) (balancing the

owner of wetland property with government interest in protecting the wetland as a
public benefit).

1992:777]

WASTE FACILITY SITING

Appeal often reject consideration of cases where the litigant has not
received a final decision from the regulating authority or has not
exhausted state procedures.373
Of the three trilogy cases, First English has been cited most
frequently by the lower courts. Perhaps this occurred both because
First English represented an obvious departure from former regulatory
takings jurisprudence and because the decision opened the door to a
remedy for the numerous governmental delays experienced by property
owners.37 4 Although it has been widely asserted by plaintiffs and
discussed extensively by federal and state courts,3a7 the decision has
373. For cases holding that claims were not ripe for review, see Executive 100,
Inc. v. Martin County, 922 F.2d 1536, 1551-52 (lth Cir. 1991); Southern Pacific
Transp. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 922 F.2d 498, 506 (9th Cir. 1990); Erie v.
Sarasota County, 908 F.2d 716, 726-27 (1lth Cir. 1990); Estate of Himelstein v. Fort
Wayne, 898 F.2d 573, 576 (7th Cir. 1990); Neighborhood Ass'n v. Planning & Zoning
Comm'n, 888 F.2d 1573, 1575-76 (lth Cir. 1989); Tenoco Oil Company, Inc. v.
Department of Consumer Affairs, 876 F.2d 1013, 1028 (1st Cir. 1989); Smith v. City
of Brenham, 865 F.2d 662, 664 (5th Cir. 1989); Hammond v. Baldwin, 866 F.2d 172
(6th Cir. 1989); Coniston Corp. v. Village of Hoffman Estates, 844 F.2d 461, 463-64
(7th Cir. 1988); see also Meredith v. Talbot County, 828 F.2d 228 (4th Cir. 1987)
(applying Burford abstention doctrine and failing to reach the merits of the underlying
takings claim because the zoning regulation was comprehensive and peculiar to the
state). But cf. Sierra Lake Reserve v. City of Rocklin, 938 F.2d 951, 955 (9th Cir.
1991) (holding that claimants were not required to pursue additional state remedies
for takings claim where those efforts would be futile given state position on the claim);
Del Monte Dunes v. City of Monterey, 920 F.2d 1496, 1509 (10th Cir. 1990)
(landowner's challenge to city regulations designed to protect the "Smiths Blue
Butterfly" met the ripeness requirements); Beacon Hill Farm Assoc. v. Loudoun
County, 875 F.2d 1081, 1084-85 (4th Cir. 1989); Hoehne v. County of San Benito,
870 F.2d 529, 533-34 (9th Cir. 1989).
374. See supra notes 366-67 and accompanying text.
375. See Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning
Agency, 938 F.2d 153, 156 (9th Cir. 1991); Huber v. Casablanca Indus., Inc., 916
F.2d 85, 102 (3d Cir. 1990); Wheeler v. City of Pleasant Grove, 896 F.2d 1347, 1350
(lth Cir. 1990); Peduto v. City of North Wildwood, 878 F.2d 725, 727 n.1 (3d Cir.
1989); Adolph v. Federal Emergency Management Agency, 854 F.2d 732, 736 (5th
Cir. 1988); National Wildlife Fed'n v. Burford, 835 F.2d 305, 337 (D.C. Cir. 1987);
Richardson v. Honolulu, 759 F. Supp. 1477, 1497 (D. Haw. 1991); accord Tahoe
Regional Planning Agency v. King, 285 Cal. Rptr. 335, 351 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991);
State v. The Mill, 809 P.2d 434, 438 (Colo. 1991); Goldberg v. City of Rehoboth
Beach, 565 A.2d 936, 944 (Del. Super. Ct. 1989); Orlando v. W & F Agrigrowth, 582
So. 2d 790, 792 (Fla. Ct. App. 1991); Schwartz v. City of Flint, 466 N.W.2d 357, 360
(Mich. Ct. App. 1991); Elam v. City of St. Ann, 784 S.W.2d 330, 337 n.5 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1990); Stoner v. Township of Lower Merion, 587 A.2d 879, 885-86 (Pa. Commw.
Ct. 1991); Three D Corp. v. Salt Lake City, 752 P.2d 1321, 1323 n.1 (Utah Ct. App.
1988); Reel Enterprises v. City of LaCrosse, 431 N.W.2d 743, 747 (Wis. Ct. App.
1988).
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rarely formed the basis for a court to grant plaintiffs a monetary
remedy.376
Practitioners who consider alleging a temporary taking due to a
permit denial for a waste site should note two important issues which
may stand in the way of a monetary recovery. First, similar to the test
for denial of all economic viability in Keystone, First English requires
77
that "all use" be denied during the alleged taking period . Illinois
courts have been persuaded to deny recovery for temporary takings
on this basis.178 Second, the court will not allow recovery for79 delays
in permitting or licensing which are ordinary and reasonable.
Thus, the arguments presented for consideration by practitioners
under this part illustrate the promises and pitfalls of bringing a just
compensation action against the government in the case of either a
temporary taking or a permanent permit denial. The success or failure
of a regulatory takings claim directed' against the Illinois siting statute
will depend both on the correct procedural posturing and on proper
framing of the legitimacy review and denial of investment-backed
expectations issues. While there is no guarantee that such a claim
against the Illinois statute will be successful given the divergent interpretation of takings analysis, permit applicants denied at the local level
should find that the heightened legitimacy review and compelling
evidence of denial of investment-backed expectations38 ° strengthen their
376. See St. Lucas Ass'n v. City of Chicago, 571 N.E.2d 865, 875 (11. Ct. App.
1991) (holding that plaintiff had failed to demonstrate all elements necessary to sustain
a temporary takings claim); Virginia Beach v. Virginia Land Investment Ass'n No. 1,
389 S.E.2d 312, 316 (Va. 1990) (distinguishing First English on its facts). But see
Wheeler v. City of Pleasant Grove, 896 F.2d 1347, 1352 (11th Cir. 1990) (granting
plaintiff damages for temporary taking).
377. See Herrington v. County of Sonoma, 857 F.2d 567, 570 (9th Cir. 1988);
United States v. Rivera Torres, 826 F.2d 151, 157-58 (1st Cir. 1987); accord Port
Clinton Ass'n v. Board of Selectmen, 587 A.2d 126, 133 n.15 (Conn. 1991); Steen v.
County Council of Sussex County, 576 A.2d 642, 649 (Del. Ch. 1989); Standard
Indus., Inc. v. Department of Transp., 454 N.W.2d 417, 418 (Mich. Ct. App. 1990);
cf. Bryant v. Town of Essex, 564 A.2d 1052, 1056 (Vt. 1989).
378. Suhadolnick v. City of Springfield, 540 N.E.2d 895, 910 (Ill. App. Ct.
1989); Medical Center Comm'n v. P. Carlton at Ogden & Oakley, Inc., 523 N.E.2d
1091, 1097-98 (111. App. Ct. 1988).
379. Bello v. Walker, 840 F.2d 1124, 1131 (3d Cir. 1988) (recognizing that First
English does not afford a remedy for normal delays in permitting or appealing
decisions); accord Friel v. Triangle Oil Co., 543 A.2d 863, 867 (Md. Ct. App. 1988)
(stating that nine-month moratorium may be a normal delay); Standard Indus., Inc.
v. Department of Transp., 454 N.W.2d 417, 419 (Mich. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that
delay experienced by plaintiff in developing property was not unreasonable).
380. For example, several counties charge waste site developers an application
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case significantly. And while a takings claim may not result in the
siting of a facility, a few just compensation awards to waste developers
may lead the Illinois legislature and Illinois courts to rethink their
position on the siting statute.
CONCLUSION

The Illinois legislature has gone too far in placing the burden of
waste management, a burden that should be carried by all, on waste
site developers and industrial generators. By transferring decisionmaking authority from the state to the local level, the legislature acted
expediently in the political sense but created waste management problems which may plague the state in the future. As a matter of policy,
Illinois should strive to promote the location of technologically sound,
state-of-the-art waste facilities if it is to prevent a waste capacity
shortfall. The siting statute as presently drafted, interpreted, and
implemented precludes efficient siting because the NIMBY syndrome
has found its way into every county-board hearing. While meaningful
public participation in the siting process is a worthy goal, public
opposition that is blind to technical realities has no place in a regulatory
scheme that must promote safe and adequate disposal sites.
A state siting scheme that grants local governments near veto
power over permit applicants conflicts, in an obvious way, with a
national goal to increase capacity through new waste management
facilities. As Congress begins to recognize that waste disposal capacity
is a truly national problem, it is likely to enact legislation which will
provide attorneys with a clear basis for a preemption argument.
Practitioners would be well-advised to monitor developments in federal
legislation or regulation concerning RCRA and CERCLA.
Because recent developments in the Supreme Court's takings
analysis indicate a shift favoring landowners and developers, the
attorney whose client is faced with an adverse siting decision should
consider a Fifth Amendment challenge to the siting statute. Although
the state will surely defend the statute as a proper exercise of its police
power, close analysis of the statute suggests that it may not survive
the legitimacy prong of the current takings analysis. As applied, the
statute does not exhibit a close fit between the stated goals of insuring
safe and adequate disposal and the means which emphasize public
fee of two-hundred and fifty thousand dollars ($250,000). IEPA SITING REPORT, supra
note 15, at Appendix B. One could argue that expensive application fees may alone
supply evidence of a distinct investment-backed expectation. See also Stotts, supra
note 17.
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participation to the exclusion of other factors. Moreover, reasonable
investment-backed expectations of permit applicants are being frustrated by local denials and may provide an independent basis for an
award of just compensation.
For over a decade, waste facility developers and generators who
treat on-site have had their efforts to advance environmentally-sound
disposal techniques curbed or foreclosed by the current regulatory
scheme. Widespread public opposition has become a primary demonstrable. criterion, if not the sole one, for county boards to consider.
Because Illinois courts have been unreceptive to general claims that
the process is unfair, environmental and land-use practitioners should
consider the two constitutional arguments, offered in this comment,
as responses to local, adverse siting decisions. Ironically, freeing waste
management companies from their undesirable position, between the
rock and the hard place, may be the only way for Illinois to escape
its "legacy of contaminated sites" 3 ' and to preserve the health and
safety of its citizens.
TARA FETHERLING

381. A recent compilation of twenty case studies on contaminated sites is indicative of the state's improper management of waste disposal. DrvisioN OF LAND
POLLrTION CONTROL, ILL. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, CLEANING ILLINOIS (1990).
The report gives an inventory of current and projected contaminated sites as follows:

544
1984 ....................................................................
1348
1990 ....................................................................
2200
2000 ....................................................................
Id. at 41-42.

